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WHAT SHOULD LAW SCHOOL STUDENT CONDUCT
CODES DO?
Steven K. Berenson*

I. INTRODUCTION
With the highly publicized and financially devastating collapses of
Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and other large corporate entities,
which were at least in part the result of malfeasance on the part of their
corporate executives and the professionals who served the corporations,
the topic of professional ethics has once again come to the forefront of
public consciousness. Recent months have seen calls for increased
instruction in ethics in undergraduate, business, and other professional
schools,1 new codes of conduct for individual corporations2 and
professions such as business and accounting,3 and the proliferation of
ethics officers for corporations.4 And while it is true that most of the
* Associate Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. The author wishes to thank Ilene
Durst, Anders Kaye, and Marc Rohr for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft. The author also
wishes to thank Genail Anderson, Thomas Jefferson School of Law Class 2004, for helpful research
assistance during the preparation of this article. Last, but certainly not least, the author wishes to
thank Deanna Sampson for continuing support.
1. See, e.g., Stacy Humes-Schulz, Ethical Soul Searching at Business Schools, FINANCIAL
TIMES, July 12, 2002, at 9; Lisa Eisenhauer, Scandals Bolster Calls for Ethics Training, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, July 15, 2002, at A5. Even President Bush called on business schools to do a
better job of teaching business ethics to future executives. See Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton,
Enron: Lessons and Implications: Lawyers, Ethics and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 10 & n.8
(2002).
2. See Harry Wessel, On the Job Ethics, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, June 16, 2003.
See also Amanda Sinclair, Codes in the Workplace: Organisational versus Professional Codes, in
CODES OF ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS 88 (Margaret Coady & Sidney Block eds., Melb. U. Press
1996).
3. See Jenny B. Davis, CORPORATE-CRIME FIGHTER: Ex-Prosecutor Teams With
Prisoners to Teach Ethics to Executives, 89 A.B.A.J. 26 (Feb. 2003).
4. See Elizabeth Chamblis and David Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors,
General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 AZ. L. REV. 559
(2002); Deroy Murdock, Corporate Need for Ethics, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, August 28,
2003, at B8, available at http://www.shns.com/shns/g_index2.cfm?action=detail&pk=MURDOCK-
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attention in these discussions has focused on “accountants, managers,
and boards of directors[,]”5 it is also indisputable that lawyers were
involved in virtually every questionable transaction these entities
engaged in.6 Therefore, it seems appropriate that lawyers’ ethics
undergo similar scrutiny.
It also seems that the time may be ripe for renewed interest in legal
ethics in light of the apparent temporal cycles that effect such inquiries.
It has often been noted that the Watergate scandal of the mid 1970s was
a major force in driving the large-scale effort to focus on legal ethics as a
subject meriting serious academic teaching and scholarship.7 And, a
little more than a decade later, the financial scandals of the late 1980s
gave rise to another call for increased attention to legal ethics.8 Thus,
with another period of a little more than a decade having passed, perhaps
the time is ripe for another round of inquiries in light of the most recent
scandals.
All along the way, extensive literature has developed regarding
effective and ineffective ways of teaching ethics in law school.9 It is not
the intention of this article to repeat insights developed in that body of
work. However, one aspect of what I am going to refer to as a law
school’s “infrastructure” for teaching ethics,10 namely, the law school’s
08-28-03.
5. Rhode & Paton, supra note 1, at 10.
6. Id. at 10-11.
7. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Legacy of Watergate for Legal Ethics Instruction, 51 HASTINGS
L.J. 673, 675 (2000); Deborah L. Rhode, Integrity in the Practice of Law: If Integrity is the Answer,
What is the Question?, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 333, 339-40 (2003) [hereinafter Integrity]; Ronald D.
Rotunda, Teaching Legal Ethics a Quarter of a Century after Watergate, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 661
(2000).
8. Major scandals during this time period that resulted in a re-examination of the ethical
implications of the conduct of the lawyers involved included the OPM Leasing Services, Inc.
scandal and the bankruptcy of Lincoln Savings and Loan Corp. See Roger C. Cramton, Enron and
the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143, 143 & nn.2-3
(Nov. 2002). See also Integrity, supra note 7, at 340 & n.34.
9. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Less is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in Context, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 357 (1998); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, W.M. Keck Foundation Forum on the
Teaching of Legal Ethics: Introduction to the Keck Forum on the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1 (1996); David Luban & Michael Milleman, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in
Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31 (1995); James E. Moliterno, An Analysis of Ethics
Teaching in Law School: Replacing Lost Benefits of an Apprentice System in an Academic
Atmosphere, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 83 (1991); Thomas D. Morgan, Use of the Problem Method for
Teaching Legal Ethics, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 409 (1998); Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics
Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law School, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 719
(1998); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics with Stories about Clients, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 421 (1998); W. Bradley Wendel, Teaching Values in Law School: Teaching Ethics in an
Atmosphere of Skepticism and Relativism, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 711 (2002).
10. Of course, the ABA required course on legal ethics (often titled “Professional

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss4/8

2

Berenson: What Should Law School Student Conduct Codes Do?
BERENSON1.DOC

2005]

5/2/2005 8:59:42 AM

WHAT SHOULD LAW SCHOOL STUDENT CONDUCT CODES DO?

805

code of student conduct, has received very little attention in the
literature.11 Yet law school codes, at least by their own terms, purport to
have a constitutive function in educating students to become ethical
members of the legal profession.12
Another reason to focus attention on student codes at this juncture
is recent evidence of continued increases in student misconduct.13 For
example, a recent study conducted by Rutgers University Professor
Donald L. McCabe noted that thirty-eight percent of the undergraduate
students surveyed indicated that they had engaged in at least one
instance of “cut and paste” internet plagiarism, i.e., copying information
directly from an internet source and using it without attribution in a
paper submitted for credit in the past year.14 Moreover, recent suits
brought by the record industry against college students who purportedly
engaged in illegal “file swapping” involving copyrighted music indicate
another instance of widespread student misconduct.15 And, additional
evidence exists that academic misconduct has been increasing on
campuses for some time.16
Responsibility”) is the core of the totality of instruction in ethics offered by law schools - what I am
referring to here as the school’s infrastructure for teaching ethics. See generally, Luban &
Milleman, supra note 9, at 38-39. Additionally, many schools offer upper level elective courses that
devote some or all of their time to discussion of ethical issues, and some schools have gone so far as
to require the teaching of ethics “pervasively” throughout the curriculum. Id. at 39 & n.31. See
also DEBORAH L. RHODE, ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD xxix (2d ed. 1998). More recently,
a small number of schools have sought to encompass ethics teaching in a broader effort to teach
“professionalism” throughout the law school experience. See, e.g., Kimberly C. Carlos, Comment,
The Future of Law School Honor Codes: Guidelines for Creating and Implementing Effective
Honor Codes, 65 UMKC L. REV. 937, 940, 942 (1997) (citing codes from University of Alabama
School of Law and Thomas M. Cooley Law School).
11. Notable exceptions include Carlos, supra note 10, at 937 and Larry A. DiMatteo & Don
Weisner, Academic Honor Codes: A Legal and Ethical Analysis, 19 S. ILL. U. L. J. 49, 57 n.55
(1994).
12. See, e.g., Carlos, supra note 10, at 942 (quoting Thomas M. Cooley Law School’s Honor
Code).
13. Linda McGuire, Lawyer or Lying? When Law School Applicants Hide Their Criminal
Histories and Other Misconduct, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 709, 720 (2004).
14. See Sara Rimer, A Campus Fad That’s Being Copied: Internet Plagiarism Seems on the
Rise, NEW YORK TIMES, September 3, 2003, at 7.
15. See, e.g., Monitoring of Internet Use Part of Campus Life at Reno University, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, September 15, 2003, at A-5 (hereinafter Monitoring of the Internet).
16. For example, two 1993 surveys indicated that between two thirds and more than 80% of
college graduates admitted to cheating at least once during their academic careers. See Curtis J.
Berger & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the University Student,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 289, 290 & n.1 (1999) (citing Donald L. McCobe & Linda Klebe Trevino,
Academic Dishonesty: Honor Codes and Other Contextual Influences, 64 J. HIGHER EDUC. 522, 531
(1993) (stating two out of three students surveyed admitted cheating) and University Tolerates
Cheating, Professor Charges, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, May 17, 1997 (indicating that 82%
admitted cheating). More recent empirical data points to similarly high incidences of academic
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In any event, the connection to law school codes here may seem
tenuous. First, both of the above discussed recent examples of
misconduct involved undergraduate, rather than law students.
Nonetheless, many, if not most law students are not far removed in time
from their undergraduate days. Second, the morality, if not the legality
of “file swapping” may be open to question.17 At least where
prospective law students are concerned, however, the widespread lack of
concern regarding the legality of file sharing,18 should give those
concerned with legal education some pause. Third, at least as far as
music sharing goes, while such conduct may be illegal, such illegality
may not be addressed by academic conduct codes.19 In many instances,
however, the illegal file sharing took place over the colleges’ computer
networks,20 therefore involving the academic institutions in the
misconduct in a manner that may not take place with regard to other
forms of “personal” misconduct.
For all of the foregoing reasons, an examination of law school
conduct codes seems warranted. The purpose of this article, therefore, is
to evaluate the role student codes may play in the development of ethical
lawyers. In order to do so, the next Part of this article examines ethics
codes generally, focusing in particular on the functions of such codes,
the elements of such codes, and important considerations that must be
taken into account in the development of such codes.21 Three commonly
recognized functions of ethics codes are aspiration, education, and
regulation.22 Typical elements of codes include prescriptions, sanctions,
and procedures.23 Because the different functions and elements of codes
may call for different treatment in terms of the language and structure of
the codes’ provisions, difficult choices must be made in prioritizing

dishonesty. See Sara Sun Beale, Governmental and Academic Integrity at Home and Abroad, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 405, 406 (2003) (citing studies). See also McGuire, supra note 13, at 720-21.
17. Amy Harmon, Download Dilemma: Talking to the Kids, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE,
September 15, 2003, at C-1. Of course, many of those surveyed also saw nothing wrong with
“internet plagiarism” either. See Rimer, supra note 13, at 7 (stating nearly half of those surveyed
saw internet plagiarism as “trivial” or “not cheating at all”).
18. See Ted Bridis, Most Music Downloaders Don’t Care About Copyrights, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIBUNE, August 4, 2003, at C-3.
19. While some academic conduct codes make it a violation of the code to engage in a broad
range of misconduct, including illegality, which may or may not be directly related to the academic
enterprise, other codes restrict their prohibitions to conduct that directly relates to the academic
enterprise.
20. See Monitoring of the Internet, supra note 14, at A-5.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See infra Part II.B.
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among possible functions and provisions in order to safeguard the codes’
effectiveness.24
In order to establish such priorities, this article next looks at
possible differences between effective academic and professional
codes.25 In the following section, the article examines the particular
context of law schools and considers whether that context should impact
the content of student conduct codes.26 For example, because legal
education is a form of graduate education, a somewhat different form or
function for a code might be appropriate as compared to that of an
undergraduate institution.27 Additionally, legal education is professional
education, i.e., training for service in the legal profession. This fact may
impact the form and content of codes and call for differences between
codes in graduate professional education and other types of graduate
education, for example, graduate education in the arts and sciences.28
Also, the legal profession’s own code of ethics plays an unusually
prominent part in the profession’s own identity. This fact, along with
the history and development of the profession’s code of ethics, may
impact the desirable form and content of law school student codes.29
Next, all of these considerations will be drawn together in making
recommendations with regard to what the priorities for law school codes
of conduct should be.30 The conclusion, based upon the issues noted
above and discussed herein, is that priority should be placed upon a law
school code’s regulatory function. While a law school code may be able
to accomplish certain limited educational functions, such as providing
examples in the code of conduct that will violate its prescriptions,
providing for significant student involvement in code administration,
and making code proceedings and decisions accessible to the student
body, such a code is unlikely to achieve broader educational objectives
such as enhancing education in ethics throughout the law school
experience unless legal educators are willing to make significant
changes to the present law school curriculum. Because the latter
possibility seems unlikely, the educational function of a law school code
should be a lower priority than its regulatory function. Additionally,
because of the general difficulties codes have in achieving aspirational

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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objectives, along with tensions between codes’ regulatory and
aspirational functions, the conclusion here is that aspirational goals
should largely be eliminated from law school conduct codes, and should
be reassigned to a separate honor oath or pledge. Finally, in light of the
above-described priorities, the article concludes by making specific
recommendations regarding the appropriate substance and procedures
that should be incorporated in a law school code.31
Before proceeding to the next section, a discussion relating to
nomenclature is warranted. Use of the term law school “conduct code”
in the above-discussion was neither accidental nor neutral. That term, is
only one of a number of such terms that are used to describe the codes
that govern student conduct during law school. Other familiar variations
include “honor code,” “ethics code,” and “disciplinary code.” The titles
of most law schools’ codes seem to have been chosen rather
indiscriminately, with little apparent connection between the content of
the code and the title chosen to describe it. However, it seems that the
different titles that are applied to various codes imply very different
things regarding the purpose and content of the codes attached to them.
For example, use of the title “honor code” would seem to imply a system
based on the concept of honor. Professor W. Bradley Wendel defines
honor as:
an ethical system in which one’s outward presentation as a worthy
person is confirmed or challenged by others in the relevant social
group, who confer honor on persons exhibiting valued characteristics
and shame on those who deviate from prescribed standards.32

As Professor Wendel further notes, while it would likely be
possible to codify a true honor code in terms of a detailed set of rules,
because determinations of honor and shame tend to be extremely context
dependent, and based upon a great range of particular understandings of
the relatively small social group involved, honor systems tend to be
codified in very general terms, or not codified at all.33 Therefore, a true
law school “honor” code likely would feature a small number of very
general standards,34 or perhaps would be unwritten entirely, and would
31. See infra Part VI.
32. W. Bradley Wendel, The Legal Profession: Looking Backward: Regulation of Lawyers
Without the Code, The Rules, or the Restatement: Or, What Do Honor and Shame Have to do With
Civil Discovery Practice?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1567, 1577-78 (2003).
33. Id. at 1578-79. Indeed, Professor Wendel goes on to argue in his article that broad
concepts of honor and shame might play a constructive role in curbing civil discovery abuse, in lieu
of detailed codified legal rules governing the discovery process. Id. at 1599-1616.
34. Indeed, perhaps the best known academic honor code is that of the United States Military
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be interpreted in terms of widely shared understandings within the law
school community regarding the meaning of the terms of the code.
On the other hand, use of the term “code of ethics” seems to imply
that the code reflects certain moral precepts.35 While some philosophical
traditions,36 and even some legal scholars,37 might argue for a sharp
distinction between the concepts of ethics and morality, most would
contend that the two are intertwined, and a code of ethics must therefore,
of necessity, embody certain moral principles.38 And, as will be
discussed in greater detail below, the inclusion of broad moral principles
in a conduct code may require a choice in terms of code provisions in
favor of broad and abstract standards, rather than narrow and particular
rules.39 Use of the term “disciplinary code,” by contrast, seems to place
a heightened emphasis on the sanctions available under the code in the
event that its substantive provisions are violated.40
Finally, use of the term law school “conduct code,” without
reference to terms such as “honor” or “ethics,” would seem to reflect a
more particular focus on specific rules regulating the behavior of law
students, without regard to the informal community norms that are at the
center of honor systems, or the moral precepts that are at the center of
ethics codes.41 Of course, no set of rules governing conduct can be
totally devoid of moral considerations, but use of the term conduct code
clearly reflects a de-emphasis of such considerations.
It is contended here that the term “code of conduct” is the more
appropriate title for law school codes, both as a descriptive and as a
normative matter. As a descriptive matter, a review of law school codes
indicates that, regardless of the title that is attached to them, the vast
majority of law school codes consist primarily of a large number of
Academy (USMA) at West Point, which in its entirety consists of a mere thirteen words: “A cadet
will not lie, cheat or steal, nor tolerate those who do.” DiMatteo & Weisner, supra note 11, at 56
(quoting UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY PRESS, HONOR GUIDE FOR OFFICERS 4 (1958)). For
a thorough historical and analytic account of the USMA code, see John H. Beasley, The USMA
Honor System - A Due Process Hybrid, 118 MIL. L. REV. 187 (1989).
35. Cf. Luban & Milleman, supra note 9, at 49-50 (noting that removal of the term “ethics”
from the title of the professional code governing lawyers was emblematic of the removal of moral
precepts from the substance of the code itself).
36. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS xv-xvi (3d ed. 2001)
(discussing Hegel’s philosophy).
37. See Luban & Milleman, supra note 9, at 46 (discussing the views of Yale Law School
Professor Geoffrey Hazard).
38. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 36, at xvi.
39. See infra notes 59-94 and accompanying text.
40. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
41. Indeed, it is the change in terminology from “ethics” to “code” that Luban and Milleman
decry. LUBAN & MILLEMAN, supra note 9, at 44-45.
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detailed regulatory provisions covering a wide range of possible student
behaviors, and such codes place a much lesser emphasis on broad moral
precepts. Moreover, it is the contention of this article that this state of
affairs is as it should be, and that the regulatory function of law school
codes should, of necessity, be emphasized over the aspirational and
educational functions that such codes may serve.42 Therefore, the term
“conduct code” will be used throughout the remainder of this article.
II. CODES GENERALLY
Before turning to a more particular focus on law school codes, this
section of the article will explore some issues that apply to codes
generally. Specifically, this section will address the primary functions of
conduct codes, the key elements of such codes, as well as some
important issues with regard to the drafting of such codes.
A. Functions of Codes
There are three primary functions of codes as they relate to persons
bound by them: aspiration, education, and regulation.43 In their
aspirational aspects, codes set forth the ideals towards which persons
bound by the codes should strive to achieve.44 Of course, a classic
example of a code with clear aspirational aspects is the ABA’s Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code).45 Among other
provisions, the Model Code contains nine Canons which “are statements
of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of
professional conduct expected of lawyers . . . .”46 In their educational
42. See infra Part II.A.
43. Mark S. Frankel, Professional Codes: Why, How, and with What Impact, 8 J. BUS. ETHICS
109, 110-11 (1989). In their excellent article regarding academic honor codes, DiMatteo & Wiesner
combine Frankel’s first two categories, aspiration and education, into a single category of
educational purposes. DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note 11, at 57 n.55. However, the present
discussion maintains Frankel’s three-part division. See also Loane Skene, A Legal Perspective on
Codes of Ethics, in CODES OF ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS 111 (Margaret Coady & Sidney Block
eds., Melb. U. Press 1996) (discussing aspirational and prescriptive aspects of codes—the latter
corresponding roughly to Frankel’s regulatory category). Judith Lichtenberg notes that apart from
the effect codes may have on those bound by them, codes may also have an “expressive” function
vis-á-vis those outside of the group bound by the code. See Judith Lichtenberg, What are Codes of
Ethics For?, in CODES OF ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS 23-24 (Margaret Coady & Sidney Block
eds., Melb. U. Press 1996). Thus, codes may also express to the broader public the ideals and
values of the group that promulgated the code. Id.
44. Frankel, supra note 43, at 110.
45. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
46. Id. at Preliminary Statement. Examples of the Canons include Canon 8: “A Lawyer
Should Assist in Improving the Legal System and Canon 9: “A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the
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aspects, codes seek to demonstrate with clarity the type of conduct that
is prescribed or approved by the code.47 Often, codes accomplish their
educational aims through the use of examples, commentary, or
interpretations.48 A good example of codes which have educative
aspects of this sort are the American Law Institute Restatements of the
Law. The individual Restatement provisions include both commentary
on how to interpret the principle rule and illustrations of how the rule
applies in practice.49 Finally, in their regulatory aspect, codes may
include a detailed set of rules set forth to govern the conduct of the
persons bound by the code.50 As their name implies, the ABA’s Model
Rules of Professional Conduct provide an example of a code which is
heavy on regulatory content.51
B. Elements of Codes
In addition to their primary functions, codes of conduct generally
have three types of elements: prescriptions, sanctions, and procedures.
Prescriptions include the substance of the code, namely provisions
setting forth what the persons governed by the code “ought to do or not
do, or more generally how they ought to comport themselves, or what
they, or the [group] as a whole, ought to aspire to.”52 Of course, the
code’s prescriptions can serve any or all of the above-discussed
functions of the code.
Thus, a code’s prescriptions can have
aspirational, educative, or regulatory functions.53 And, as will be
discussed in more detail below, the primary function of any of a code’s
prescriptions will have a definite impact on the content or manner of
phrasing a given prescription.54
Besides prescriptions, codes may incorporate sanctions which apply
Appearance of Professional Impropriety[.]” The Canons, as well as the other provisions of the
Model Code are discussed in greater detail below. See infra at notes 117-43 and accompanying
text.
47. Frankel, supra note 43, at 110.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1977).
50. Frankel, supra note 43, at 111.
51. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2002). Examples of regulatory
provisions contained within the Model Rules include Rule 1.6(a): “A lawyer shall not reveal
confidential information relating to representation of a client . . . ;” and Rule 1.15(a): “A lawyer
shall hold property of clients . . . separate from the lawyer’s own property.” Id. The heavy
regulatory focus of the Model Rules is discussed in greater detail below. See infra notes 137-141
and accompanying text.
52. Lichtenberg, supra note 43, at 25.
53. Id.
54. See infra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
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when the code’s prescriptions are violated.55 Sanctions are most likely
to be present to the extent that the code has a regulatory function.56
Thus, to the extent that a code has an exclusively aspirational or
educational function, it may not include any sanctions at all; compliance
may be purely voluntary.57 Finally, to the extent that a code does
employ some sort of sanctions, it must have a procedural component as
well, to assure that the sanctions are imposed in a fair and consistent
manner. In U.S. public schools, of course, the imposition of sanctions
and the procedures utilized in doing so may be governed by
Constitutional requirements of due process. The application of due
process principles in the context of academic discipline is discussed
below.58
C. Drafting Issues
As implied above, some codes incorporate only one of the three
functions of codes previously discussed. For example, as also suggested
above, some codes may be purely aspirational, and therefore, may not
incorporate any sanctions for failure to live up to the standards set forth
in the code. Some of the lawyer “civility” codes adopted during the
1990s serve as examples of these types of “aspiration only” codes.59 On
the other hand, many codes combine all three functions in a single code.
A good example of this is again provided by the ABA Model Code. The
Model Code’s Canons,60 as well as its Ethical Considerations,61
represent the Code’s aspirational function. On the other hand, the Model
Code’s Disciplinary Rules represent its regulatory function. “The

55. Lichtenberg, supra note 43, at 25. Some of the general categories of sanctions that are
typically employed by professional codes are as follows: “imposition of a fine; declaration of a
finding of impropriety; suspension from practice; imposition of conditions of practice; reduction of
status of practice; removal of the right to practice.” Ian Freckelton, Enforcement of Ethics, in
CODES OF ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS 147 (Margaret Coady & Sidney Block eds., Melb. U.
Press 1996).
56. See Lichtenberg, supra note 43, at 26; Frankel, supra note 43, at 111.
57. See Raymond Ripple, Student Article, Learning Outside of the Fire: The Need for Civility
Instruction in Law School, 15 NOTRE DAME J. LEG. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 359, 370 nn.61-62 (2001)
(discussing lawyer “civility codes”).
58. See infra Part VI.
59. See supra note 57. See also discussion infra at notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
61. According to its Preliminary Statement, the Model Code’s Ethical Considerations “are
aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession
should strive.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement (1969). The
Model Code makes clear that failure to live up to the aspirations set forth in the Ethical
Considerations should not provide the basis for disciplinary action against the lawyer. Id.
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Disciplinary Rules . . . are mandatory in character[] . . . [and] state the
minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being
subject to disciplinary action.”62 At first glance, the Model Code’s
educational function is less readily apparent than its aspirational and
regulatory functions. This is because none of its three categories of
provisions, Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules, are
primarily identified as serving an educational function, with the first two
serving an aspirational function63 and the latter serving a regulatory
function.64 However, the Disciplinary Rules are heavily footnoted, and
often these footnotes provide examples of how the Disciplinary Rules
have been, and should be, applied.65 Additionally, at least some of the
Ethical Considerations are intended to “constitute . . . principles upon
which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations.”66
Moreover, the Ethical Considerations are also heavily footnoted with
examples of how the principles stated therein have been, and should be,
applied.67 Thus, at a minimum, the footnotes and some of the Ethical
Considerations serve the Model Code’s educational function.
The primary function of a particular provision of a code will likely
have a significant impact on the manner in which that provision is
drafted. To the extent that the purpose of a particular code provision is
to state or to foster broad or abstract aspirational ideals and values, it is
likely that the provision’s language will be similarly broad, general, or
abstract.68 On the other hand, if the purpose of a code provision is to
mandate or prescribe certain behavior, then the language must

62. Id.
63. See supra notes 60-61.
64. See supra note 62.
65. For example, DR 1-102(a)(3) states that “[a] lawyer shall not [e]ngage in illegal conduct
involving moral turpitude.” Footnote 13 to that provision then goes on to discuss examples of
illegal conduct that courts have found amounts to moral turpitude. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
66. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1969).
67. For example, Ethical Consideration 1-6 states in part that “[l]awyers should be diligent in
taking steps to see that during a period of disqualification such person is not granted a license or, if
licensed, is not permitted to practice.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (1969). Footnote
9, which accompanies that statement, cites a case in which a lawyer was compelled by the court to
demonstrate that his practice during a period of suspension was not “knowing.” Id. at EC 1-6 n.9
(citing In re Sherman, 58 Wash.2d 1, 6-7, 354 P.2d 888, 890 (1960), cert. denied 371 U.S. 951, 9
L.Ed.2d 499, 83 S.Ct. 506 (1963)).
68. Lichtenberg, supra note 43, at 25-26. See also Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between
Standards and Rules: A New Way of Understanding the Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes
of Conduct Between U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1117 (1999); Fred C.
Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of
Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 233 (1993).
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necessarily be more specific.69 Educational provisions, in turn, require
rather extensive commentary, interpretation, and examples, which
demonstrate how the code’s other provisions apply in particular
contexts.70
At least when we compare aspirational code provisions to
regulatory ones, the drafting tradeoffs should begin to look familiar to all
law students and legal academics. These tradeoffs implicate the
recurrent contrast between standards and rules.71 Standards provide for
the application of broad principles or policies to particular fact
situations.72 Standards give the person applying them the discretion “to
take into account all relevant factors or the totality of the
circumstances.”73 By contrast, rules cabin the discretion of the persons
who apply them.74 The application of the background principle or policy
is built into the rule itself and yields predetermined results when the fact
pattern addressed by the rule arises.75
The various advantages and disadvantages of standards and rules
apply equally to aspirational and regulatory code provisions. For
example, it may only be possible to phrase code provisions that
encompass broad, aspirational principles as standards.76 This also allows
flexibility in applying the standards in particular contexts, including
those that are new and were not anticipated at the time the code was
drafted.77 Moreover, because the standards are merely aspirational and
the code drafters presumably would not want to sanction persons for
failure to live up to those aspirations, it is not a problem that such broad
standards do not lend themselves well to enforcement through
disciplinary mechanisms.78 On the other hand, code provisions may be
stated so broadly as to open them up to charges of undue vagueness or
meaninglessness. And the lack of enforceable sanctions for violation of
such provisions may lead to similar cynicism as to their importance.
69. Daly, supra note 68, at 1133; Lichtenberg, supra note 43, at 26; Zacharias, supra note 68,
at 244.
70. Frankel, supra note 43, at 110.
71. Daly, supra note 68, at 1117 nn.1-6 (citing to the wealth of scholarship discussing the
dichotomy between standards and rules in a variety of legal subject areas).
72. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58
(1992). See also Daly, supra note 68, at 1123.
73. Sullivan, supra note 72, at 59.
74. Id. at 58. Daly, supra note 68, at 1123.
75. Sullivan, supra note 72, at 58. Daly, supra note 68, at 1123.
76. See Charles Frankel, The Code of Professional Responsibility, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 874,
879 (1976) (book review) [hereinafter Charles Frankel, The Code].
77. See supra note 73.
78. See Charles Frankel, The Code, supra note 76, at 879-80.
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Rules, by contrast, in giving detailed notice of conduct that is
prohibited or mandated, may do a better job of actually controlling such
conduct and may form a more appropriate basis for coercive sanctions
for violation of the rule. On the other hand, rules are often necessarily
over or under inclusive.79 Thus, some inappropriate conduct will not be
addressed merely because the code drafters did not think of it at the time
the rules were drafted.80 On the other hand, some conduct, which may
seem excusable given the circumstances, will nonetheless fall within a
rule’s formal prescriptions. Additionally, by turning application of the
rules from an exercise in moral reasoning to one of relatively rote
application, the code’s educational and aspirational objectives may be
inhibited.81
A final point along these lines is that in codes where the three
possible functions (aspirational, educational, and regulatory) are
combined, the necessary contrast in provision language (rules and
standards) may cause its own inherent tension. A good example of this
may be provided by what is perhaps the best known of all student
conduct codes, that of the United States Military Academy (USMA).
Even as amended, the formal USMA code consists of merely thirteen
words.82 However, despite this extremely broad, perhaps aspirational
standard, the code is embedded within a complex, multi-layered “honor
system,” which includes extensive regulations that provide a multitude
of narrow rules to supplement the code itself.83 At least one set of
commentators has noted that the presence of the regulations has tended
to replace students’ moral reasoning regarding the code’s application
with a narrow focus on what is or is not permitted by the rules.84
Another commentator has lamented that the regulations have tended to
“obscure the spirit of the code and exacerbate the conflict. . .
between . . . [broader notions of] honor and the regulations.”85
79. Sullivan, supra note 72, at 58.
80. See Vincent R. Johnson, The Virtues and Limits of Codes in Legal Ethics, 14 NOTRE
DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’L 25, 42 (2000).
81. David Luban and Michael Milleman have referred to legal ethics codes evolution from
standards to rules in terms of the “de-moralization” of legal ethics. Luban & Milleman, supra note
9, at 41. See also Johnson, supra note 80, at 37.
82. See supra note 34.
83. DiMatteo & Weisner, supra note 11, at 56-57. In addition to the code and regulations, the
honor system includes educational programs regarding the code’s implementation. Id. at 56 (citing
Beasley, supra note 34, at 187). Of course, to the extent that the code language itself represents the
aspirational function of the USMA code and the regulations represent the regulatory function, the
education programs necessarily represent the system’s educational function. Id.
84. Id. at 57.
85. Id. (quoting Beasley, supra note 34, at 193).
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Another example may lie with respect to some of the attorney
civility codes adopted during the 1990s.86 Beginning in the 1980s, in
response to perceived crises with regard to both the broader issue of
attorney professionalism87 and the narrower issue of attorney civility,88 a
number of jurisdictions adopted “civility” codes: sets of provisions
designed to increase civility in the practice of law.89 Here, a distinction
must be drawn between the relatively short and broadly stated honor or
86. A detailed analysis of the movement toward civility codes in legal practice is beyond the
scope of this article—the following summary will suffice for present purposes. However, a number
of detailed and useful analyses of civility codes and the “civility movement” have been written.
See, e.g., Adam Owen Gilst, Enforcing Courtesy: Default Judgments and the Civility Movement, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 757 (2000); Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility
Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 657 (1994); Austin Sarat, Enactments of
Professionalism: A Study of Judges’ and Lawyers’ Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 809 (1998); Brenda Smith, Comment, Civility Codes: The Newest Weapons in
the “Civil” War Over Proper Attorney Conduct Regulations Miss Their Mark, 24 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 151 (1998).
87. Former Chief Justice Burger likely began the chorus of voices bemoaning professionalism
lost. See Chief Justice Warren W. Burger, remarks at The Midyear Meeting of the American Bar
Association (Feb. 13-14, 1984), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 2471 (Feb. 28, 1984). The ABA took up
Burger’s rallying cry and subsequently issued its own “blueprint” for increasing lawyer
professionalism. See ABA Comm’n on Professionalism, ‘. . . In the Spirit of Public Service:’ A
Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986). Nonetheless, the
voices bemoaning the decline in attorney professionalism continued into the next decade. Though
overall there were too many to mention, three of the most prominent, which may have caused a
crescendo in what one might call the declination view, were MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION
UNDER LAWYERS (Ferrar, Straus and Giroux 1994); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:
FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (Harvard Univ. Press 1993); and SOL M. LINOWITZ &
MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (Charles Scribner’s Sons 1994).
88. Unfortunately, some discussions of these issues have improperly used these terms
interchangeably. See Ripple, supra note 57, at 360. For present purposes, the term civility will be
used to refer to “the act of treating other people with courtesy, dignity, and kindness.” Id. at 359.
On the other hand, the term professionalism will be used to refer to a range of issues in the delivery
of legal services that relate to the following elements, which are essential components of a
definition of a profession: 1) performance for public good; 2) special knowledge and training
requirements; 3) special vulnerability or dependency of the profession’s clients on the particular
member of the profession performing the professional service; and 4) self regulation. See, e.g.,
Robert K. Fullinwider, Professional Codes and Moral Understanding, in CODES OF ETHICS AND
THE PROFESSIONS 72,73 (Margaret Coady & Sidney Block eds., Melb. U. Press 1996); Russell G.
Pearce, The Professional Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the
Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1240 (1995).
89. The best known such code was that adopted by the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, Final
Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit (1992), reprinted in 143
F.R.D. 441 (1992) (hereinafter Final Report), which served as a model for many subsequent codes.
See Christopher J. Pizzola, Comment, Ethical Versus Procedural Approaches to Civility: Why
Ethics 2000 Should Have Adopted a Civility Rule, 74 U. COL. L. REV. 1197, 1216 (2003). Indeed,
in the three years following the Seventh Circuit’s action, more than 100 other jurisdictions adopted
similar codes. Id. at 1216 n.114 (citing Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the
Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 278 n.74 (1995)).
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civility oaths or pledges adopted in some jurisdictions90 and the much
more detailed civility codes adopted in others.91 Though the purposes of
both varieties of such codes were stated as being broadly aspirational,92
for example, to get attorneys to treat each other and other persons
involved with the legal system with dignity and respect, the means
chosen to achieve such ends were very different. And in the case of the
more detailed codes, provisions adopted have many of the hallmarks of
rules; they are “highly mechanical, technical, and context-specific.”93
Indeed, critics of such an approach contend that the rule-like form of
such provisions have prevented them from achieving their broadly
aspirational objectives, by among other reasons, discouraging ethical
deliberation about the rules and allowing the rules themselves to be used
in an offensive manner inconsistent with the purposes behind the
codes.94
Regardless of how one feels about the effectiveness of the USMA
code or the attorney civility codes discussed above, these examples serve
to reinforce the point that code drafters have difficult choices to make
regarding the nature of the language and provisions to include in the
code and tensions that may be created by incorporating different types of
provisions, with perhaps different purposes, in the same code.
III. SHOULD ACADEMIC CODES DIFFER FROM PROFESSIONAL CODES?
The foregoing discussion is based primarily on literature dealing
with professional codes.95 And while there are many similarities,
90. See, e.g., Creed of Professionalism, FLABAR ONLINE, at http://www.thefloridabar.org
(last visited Feb. 5, 2005). See also Smith, supra note 86, at 160-61 & n.73.
91. The Seventh Circuit’s Code falls into this category: the final version contains over 50
separate rules, stated in terms of ethical imperatives and procedural rules. Pizzola, supra note 89, at
1217. See also Smith, supra note 86, at 160 & n.70. Smith also identifies “combination codes,”
which contain attributes of both types of codes. Id. at 160 & nn.71-72.
92. See Ripple, supra note 57, at 360 & n.7; Final Report, supra note 89, at 448. Indeed,
compliance with many such codes was purely voluntary. On the other hand, a few such codes were
mandatory. See Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 287-88
(N.D. Tex. 1988) (adopting mandatory civility code for Northern District of Texas). Additionally, a
number of courts, relying on their inherent authority to regulate the conduct of lawyers that appear
before the court, have nonetheless imposed sanctions on lawyers for violating various aspects of
such civility codes, even where compliance with such codes was intended to be purely voluntary.
See James E. Moliterno, Lawyer Creeds and Moral Seismography, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 781,
797 & n.127 (1997); Ripple, supra note 57, at 370-71 & nn.63-66; Smith, supra note 86, at 167-69.
93. Pizzola, supra note 89, at 1217.
94. Id. at 1216-17; Moliterno, supra note 92, at 796; Smith, supra note 86, at 167.
95. Of course, the question of what is a profession has received a great deal of discussion, and
remains controversial. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 88, at 1229. For present purposes, what are
considered to be the key elements of a profession are set forth at note 88, supra.
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naturally, the objectives of professional codes vary somewhat from the
objectives of academic codes.96 At a minimum, professional codes seek
to encourage members of the profession to act, or to refrain from acting,
in certain prescribed ways.97
Professional codes also may set
aspirational standards for the profession as a whole, as well as for
individual members of the profession to strive towards.98 Additionally,
professional codes may provide a basis for moral deliberation with
regard to professional decision making.99 Professional codes have an
expressive function, communicating to the general public the ideals and
values of the profession,100 helping to establish expectations on the part
of the public for their dealings with members of the professional
group,101 and demonstrating to the public that the profession has engaged
in its self-regulatory function in good faith.102 From a negative
perspective however, professional codes have been criticized as
primarily advancing the self-interests of the profession and its members,
through such devices as barriers to entry and other competition reducing
means.103
Given the different objectives of the academic enterprise, one
would naturally expect some differences from professional codes when
attention is turned to academic codes. For example, one would expect to
see a greater emphasis on the educational function of codes in academic
versus professional codes. Indeed, many academic codes explicitly
recognize their educational function.104 Additionally, academic codes
seek to foster an environment that provides for fair academic
competition and preserves the institution’s academic integrity.105
Academic codes also seek to instill personal values in the students
governed by them such as “honesty, integrity, individual responsibility,

96. Mark Frankel sets out the following list of professional code functions: 1) enabling
document; 2) source of public evaluation; 3) professional socialization; 4) enhance profession’s
reputation and public trust; 5) preserve entrenched professional biases; 6) deterrent to unethical
behavior; 7) support system; and 8) adjudication. Frankel, supra note 43, at 111-12.
97. Lichtenberg, supra note 43, at 27.
98. Freckelton, supra note 55, at 130, 131.
99. Margaret M. Coady, The Moral Domain of Professionals, in CODES OF ETHICS AND THE
PROFESSIONS 28, 50 (Margaret Coady & Sidney Block eds., Melb. U. Press 1996).
100. Id. at 48. See also Johnson, supra note 80, at 38; Lichtenberg, supra note 43, at 23-24.
101. Frankel, supra note 43, at 111.
102. See supra note 88.
103. See, e.g., Fullinwider, supra note 88, at 84; Skene, supra note 43, at 111; CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 48 (West Pub. Co. 1986).
104. See Sarah Ann Bassler, Article, Public Access to Law School Honor Code Proceedings,
15 NOTRE DAME J. LEG. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 207, 211 (2001).
105. DiMatteo & Weisner, supra note 11, at 55 n.42.
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respect, trust, and fairness.”106 Naturally, academic codes also identify
particular acts and practices that students are not permitted to engage in
and define procedures for determining whether the code has been
violated and what sanctions may be appropriate for such violations.107
In any event, the possible distinctions between academic and
professional codes should be kept in mind in attempting to determine the
appropriate purposes and content of a law school code.
IV. SHOULD LAW SCHOOL CODES DIFFER FROM OTHER ACADEMIC
CODES?
Before launching into a discussion regarding the appropriate
content of law school codes, a number of questions must be answered.
First, are there distinctions between undergraduate and graduate
education that should be reflected in the student conduct codes
applicable at each of the different educational levels? Second, are there
distinctions between graduate professional education and other types of
graduate education that should be reflected in the student conduct codes
applicable to each? Third, what should the impact be of the fact that, at
least with regard to the legal profession, there is in existence a code of
conduct that governs the profession, and indeed has been a long tradition
of such codes? Finally, procedures under law school codes will be
examined in this Part.
A. Graduate v. Undergraduate Education
Perhaps the fact that legal education is a form of graduate education
in this country, as opposed to undergraduate education,108 should have
an impact on the content of the applicable code of student conduct. For
example, we would expect students at the graduate level, as a result of
their greater age, educational, and life experiences, to have obtained a
higher level of moral reasoning than undergraduate students.109 For this
106. Carlos, supra note 10, at 940 (citations omitted). See also Bassler, supra note 104, at 210.
107. See Jason J. Bach, Students Have Rights Too: The Drafting of Student Conduct Codes,
2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 1, 1.
108. This, of course, is not necessarily the case throughout the rest of the world. For example,
in Europe, formal legal education begins at the undergraduate level. See Daly, supra note 68, at
1145.
109. See generally Maury Landsman & Steven P. McNeel, Moral Judgment of Law Students
Across Three Years’ Influences of Gender, Political Ideology, and Interest in Altruistic Law
Practice, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 891, 901 (2004); Thomas E. Willging & Thomas G. Dunn, The Moral
Development of the Law Student, 31 J. LEG. EDUC. 306 (1982) (applying Lawrence Kohlberg’s
theory of moral reasoning development to law students).
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reason, it may be that the aspirational and educational aspects of a code
of conduct are less important at the graduate level than at the
undergraduate level. Similarly, one would expect that by the time they
get to graduate school, most students have obtained a basic
understanding of many of the types of substantive conduct generally
prescribed by student codes, such as cheating on exams, plagiarism, and
improper collaboration.110 This fact also seems to point toward a
reduced emphasis on the aspirational and educational functions of
graduate student conduct codes. There is also reason for skepticism
regarding how much impact graduate education can have on the moral
character of students.111 Indeed, what little empirical evidence exists
suggests that, at least to date, law school has had very little impact on the
moral development of law students.112 All of these facts seem to point in
the direction of a greater regulatory emphasis for an academic code at
the graduate level.
B. Graduate Professional Education Versus Other Types of Graduate
Education
Another issue to consider is whether differences between graduate
professional education and other forms of graduate education, for
example masters or doctoral programs in the humanities, arts, or
sciences, ought to have an impact on the content of student conduct
codes. It may be the case that particular professions possess specific
values or adhere to particular principles that ought to be embodied in the
student codes applicable to graduate students training to become
members of a given profession.113 Indeed, many law school codes
expressly state training in the values of the profession as one of their
Additionally, one of the key features that often
objectives.114

110. This is not to deny that some of these concepts have particular and perhaps unfamiliar
applications in specific graduate educational contexts. For example, conventions regarding citation
to authority in the legal education and practice context certainly provide applications of plagiarism
principles that are likely to be completely unfamiliar to many new law students.
111. See Integrity, supra note 7, at 341-42.
112. See Mark Neal Aaronson, Be Just to One Another: Preliminary Thoughts on Civility,
Moral Character, and Professionalism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 113, 124-25 (1995) (citing studies).
Despite this empirical evidence, Aaronson remains optimistic that improved pedagogy might result
in at least small improvement in the moral reasoning abilities of law students, at least vis-á-vis their
roles as attorneys. Id. at 125-26.
113. See Carlos, supra note 10, at 941 (quoting language from the code of the Kellogg
Graduate School of Management indicating a purpose of the code to instill core values of the
“practice and profession” of management in its students).
114. See Bassler, supra note 104, at 211-12.
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distinguishes professions from other occupations is the existence of a
code of conduct that governs practice of the profession.115 It may be the
case that a particular relationship between a profession’s code of conduct
and the code applicable to students studying to join the profession is
warranted. Indeed, a number of law school conduct codes specifically
incorporate the applicable professional code, making those standards
binding on law students for purposes of academic discipline.116 These
are also facts that should be kept in mind in the drafting of a law school
code.
C. Codes and the Legal Profession
Given the importance of its code of ethics to the legal profession, as
well as the fact that some law school conduct codes presently
incorporate their jurisdiction’s applicable code, it is worth reflecting on
developments regarding the evolution of the American legal profession’s
code of conduct and what implications those developments might have
for law school codes. As discussed in greater detail above, the ABA’s
Model Code of Professional Responsibility incorporated all three
possible functions of a code: aspiration; education; and regulation.
Indeed, the sometimes uneasy relationship between these functions is a
ground for criticism of the code.117 In any event, the Model Code
represents merely a middle point in the development of codes of ethics
for the American legal profession.118
The first formal code of conduct intended to apply to all lawyers in
the United States was the ABA’s Canons of Ethics, which were adopted
in 1908.119 There is little doubt where the Canons fell on the continuum
115. See generally, CODES OF ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS (Margaret Coady & Sidney
Block eds., Melb. U. Press 1996).
116. See, e.g., AMERICAN UNIV. WASH. COLL. OF LAW HONOR CODE art. 1.02, available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/studentaffairs/honorcode.pdf, (last visited Feb. 5, 2005); CASE W.
RES. UNIV. LAW SCH. CODE OF CONDUCT § I.1, available at http://lawwww.cwru.edu/, (last visited
Dec. 19, 2003); UNIV. OF HAW. WILLIAM S. RICHARDSON SCH. OF LAW DISCIPLINARY RULES art.
III.A.3, available at http://www.hawaii.edu/law/academic/handbook/discReg.html#ART1, (last
visited Feb. 5, 2005).
117. See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
118. The following discussion is an extremely truncated description of the history of codes of
legal ethics in America, but will hopefully be sufficient for present purposes. More detailed
descriptions and analyses appear in Daly, supra note 68, at 1125-34; Luban & Milleman, supra note
9, at 42-53.
119. Daly, supra note 68, at 1125. The State of Alabama adopted the first formal code of legal
ethics in the United States in 1887. See Allison Marston, The 1887 Alabama Code, 49 ALA. L. REV.
471 (1998). The Alabama Code formed the template for the ABA’s 1908 Canons. Luban &
Milliman, supra note 9, at 43. The precursors to the Alabama Code, in turn, were David Huffman’s
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of specificity identified above;120 they were broad and abstract
standards.121 Moreover, the fact that no disciplinary enforcement
mechanism accompanied the Canons and relatively few states adopted
the Canons122 lends weight to the Canons’ primarily aspirational
character.123 However, the Canons’ generality ultimately proved to be
their undoing.124 The Canons’ broad standards were simply inadequate
to govern the increasingly diverse and complex activities of the modern
legal profession. By the 1960s, it was clear that change was needed. As
summarized by Dean Mary Daly: “too much imprecision and discretion
produced ethical incoherence, or worse, paralysis. Rules, not standards,
were needed.”125
The result was the previously discussed 1969 ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.126 As indicated above, the Code’s Canons,
Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules represented an uneasy
synthesis of rules and standards and a similarly tenuous combination of a
code’s aspirational, educational, and regulatory functions.127 It is
doubtless that the Code represented an improvement over the Canons, at
least in terms of its ability to serve as an instrument governing the
conduct of modern legal practice. Nonetheless, dissatisfaction with the
Code was widespread and its reign short-lived. While more than sixty
years passed between adoption of the Canons and the Model Code, the
Model Code was replaced by the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct in 1983, a mere fourteen years after the Model Code’s
completion.128
A number of relatively widely-shared criticisms, which are not
terribly important to the present discussion, led to the codes
replacement.129 It also seems likely that tensions between the Code’s
1836 Rules of Professional Deportment, and Judge George Sharswood’s famous 1854 lecture series.
Id. Both of these precursors were largely aspirational. See Moliterno, supra note 92, at 787.
120. See supra notes 68-70, and accompanying text.
121. Daly, supra note 68, at 1125-27.
122. Id.
123. Accord Moliterno, supra note 92, at 790.
124. Id. at 792.
125. Daly, supra note 68, at 1128.
126. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
127. Daly, supra note 68, at 1127.
128. Id. at 1130.
129. Mary Daly identifies three such widespread criticisms. First, “the Model Code provisions
were excessively concerned with the dilemmas of the courtroom lawyer and paid little or no
attention” to issues facing transactional lawyers. Id. Second, the Model Code did not anticipate the
growth of large, mega-law firms with hundreds of lawyers, and the particular issues raised by such
entities. Id. Third, the Model Code did not contain a provision relating to “former client” conflicts
of interest. Id. See also Johnson, supra note 80, at 43.
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rules and standards, as well as between its various functions,130 created
at least some impediments to its effective implementation. Perhaps most
importantly for present purposes, the changes in the legal profession that
created the need to move from the Canon’s broad standards to the
Code’s increased reliance on rules expanded further in the years
following the Code’s adoption.131 As will be discussed further below,132
some of the conditions that are often described as being necessary to the
successful implementation of broad standards (as opposed to rules) are
relatively small, homogenous communities with widely shared
experiences and values among the members.133 However, growth and
diversity of the lawyer population,134 the increasingly interstate and
international character of legal practice,135 and changes in law firm size,
structure, and culture,136 all continued to push in the opposite direction.
Thus, a further need to move along the continuum of codification from
standards to rules was perceived and led to the replacement of the Model
Code.
As their name implies, adoption of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct represented a further step in the movement of the code
governing the legal profession from standards to rules.137 While there
remain a number of standards sprinkled throughout the Model Rules as a
whole,138 the overwhelming balance of the Model Rules is in favor of
strict legal rules rather than standards.139 The views of the Reporter for
the Model Rules in this regard are instructive. According to Yale law
professor Geoffrey Hazard, “[i]t is time that lawyers and the organized
bar came to understand that they are governed by law, bound by law,
and answerable before the law, like other people.”140 Another important
recent event in the “legalization” of American legal ethics was the
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See supra notes 82-94, and accompanying text.
Daly, supra note 68, at 1130-32.
See infra notes 152-55, and accompanying text.
See Daly, supra note 68, at 1125-26.
Id. at 1131; Johnson, supra note 80, at 34-35.
Daly, supra note 68, at 1131 & n.78.
Id.
See Luban & Milleman, supra note 9, at 45; THOMAS L. SHAFFER AND MARY M.
SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 7-8
(Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1991).
138. See Daly, supra note 68, at 1133-34; Samual J. Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously:
Broad Ethics Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in a Comparative Hermeneutic
Framework, 77 TULANE L. REV. 527, 528-29 (2003); Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 668 (2001).
139. Daly, supra note 68, at 1134.
140. Luban & Milleman, supra note 9, at 46 (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rules of Legal
Ethics: The Drafting Task, REC. BAR CITY N.Y. 77, 84 (March 1981)).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 4, Art. 8
BERENSON1.DOC

824

5/2/2005 8:59:42 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[38:803

completion of the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers (Third).141 Of course, the modus operandi of
the Restatement project is to synthesize existing decisional law into
concise legal rules.
As a normative matter, whether the above-described legalization of
the code of ethics governing lawyers has been a positive or negative
development is quite controversial.142 However, as a descriptive matter,
the codes’ movement governing lawyer conduct from standards to rules
is indisputable.143 In any event, the purpose in reiterating the abovedescribed developments here is not to weigh in on the merits of the
controversy, but rather to raise the question of the implications these
developments may have regarding the appropriate content of law school
conduct codes. First, to the extent that one of the primary goals of legal
education is to train students for the practice of law, a subsidiary of that
goal might be to train students to conduct themselves in accordance with
the relevant professional code. And it may be the case that one way to
do that is to have students conduct their academic career pursuant to a
law school code that is similar in form and content to the corresponding
professional code. Additionally, to the extent that the present code
embodies the primary ideals and values of the profession, it may be the
case that a similar code for law students might also properly incorporate
the profession’s most important ideals and values.
D. Procedures Under Law School Codes
As stated above, it may be helpful to the training of future lawyers
to have a law school code that is similar in form and content to that
which governs the profession. Similarly, to the extent that certain
procedures are important in the practice of law, it may be beneficial to
give students experience in those procedures by incorporating similar
procedures into a school’s conduct code. For example, many law school
codes incorporate full blown adversary proceedings as a means toward
final determination of charges of code violations. Often, students play
major roles in such proceedings, including serving as prosecuting and
defense counsel, as well as serving as members of the deciding judicial
panel. Such students may gain a great deal of valuable experience as a
141. American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §1
(1997). See Johnson, supra note 80, at 28; Luban & Milleman, supra note 9, at 51.
142. See, e.g., Luban & Milleman, supra note 9, at 41 (describing the above history as the
“demoralization” of legal ethics).
143. Daly, supra note 68, at 1134; Johnson, supra note 80, at 27; Levine, supra note 138, at
528; Moliterno, supra note 92, at 787; Zacharias, supra note 68, at 223.
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result of their participation in such proceedings. Additionally, to the
extent that such proceedings are open to other members of the law
school community,144 they may serve an educational function even for
those who do not participate directly in the proceedings.
On the other hand, adversary proceedings have been subject to
strong criticisms for their failure to serve effectively either a truth
finding or public education function.145 And it may be the case that
adversary proceedings are particularly poorly suited to serving the
aspirational and educational functions of law school conduct codes. In
such circumstances, it may be that the objectives of law school conduct
codes are served better by some sort of less formal means of decision
making, such as some of the mechanisms included within the modern
alternative dispute resolution movement. However, while such forms of
ADR are finding increasing acceptance within the legal community, they
still remain, as their name implies, an alternative to traditional adversary
proceedings. As such, the question becomes whether, in order to have
the appropriate educative effect, procedures under law school conduct
codes should mirror the most widespread, or the “best” practices in
effect in the legal community, or whether there is even a difference
between the two in the present context.
V. PRIORITIZING AMONG POSSIBLE FUNCTIONS OF A LAW SCHOOL
CODE
Given the tensions that arise from trying to accommodate different
functions within the same code, it seems advisable to prioritize among
the possible functions of a law school code. As argued below, a law
school code’s regulatory function should be its priority, followed by its
educational function. A law school code’s aspirational objectives should
necessarily be of a lower priority.
A. Regulation
Naturally, it is difficult to arrive at a single, overriding purpose for
law school codes when the overall purpose of legal education itself
remains subject to debate.146 Whether one perceives the primary
144. The question of whether such proceedings should be open or closed is discussed in greater
detail below. See infra notes 250-58 and accompanying text. See also Bassler, supra note 104, at
207.
145. See discussion infra at notes 232-33, and accompanying text.
146. See Bethany Rubin Henderson, Asking the Lost Question: What is the Purpose of Law
School?, 53 J. LEG. EDUC. 48, 48 (2003).
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purpose of legal education to be to train future legal practitioners, to
develop the critical reasoning faculties of law students, or to groom
future participants in democratic governance, for reasons discussed both
above and below, there is cause to be skeptical that law school conduct
codes will play a central role in that function. On the other hand, law
school codes may very effectively support one of the other undeniable, if
less admirable functions of legal education, namely, sorting graduates
for their future roles in the legal profession.147 A regulatory regime that
underlies a system of fair academic competition is absolutely essential to
the validity of a school’s ability to carry out effectively its sorting
function. Of course, a regulatory system that ensures the integrity of
testing and other evaluative tools is also likely to have the effect of
enhancing some of the more salutary learning goals of the law school
mentioned above.
There are additional reasons for adopting effective regulation as the
primary value to be served by law school codes. First, as legal
academics, we likely are confident in our ability to draw relatively
effective regulatory codes, whereas, the ability of codes to serve their
other stated functions effectively remains highly controversial.148
Second, a regulatory approach is most consistent with the type of code
presently employed by the profession.149 For reasons suggested above,
this similarity may aid the school in its function of training students for
effective participation in the profession. Moreover, training students to
address the kind of ethical issues that they are likely to encounter in the
practice of law requires training in dealing with problems in the context
that they are likely to encounter in the practice of law,150 rather than the
context in which ethical problems arise in academia. Finally, a
regulatory approach seems most consistent with the propositions that
students have a pretty good general sense of right and wrong by the time
that they get to law school and a fairly sophisticated understanding of the
conduct that is permitted and prohibited in an academic setting.151 Thus,
there may little need for additional education or aspiration along these
lines in a law school code.

147. See Richard A. Ippolito, The Sorting Function: Evidence from Law School, 51 J. LEG.
EDUC. 533 (2001).
148. See infra notes 152-67, 174-75, and accompanying text.
149. See supra Part IV.C.
150. See Luban & Milleman, supra note 9, at 40-41.
151. See supra notes 109-10, and accompanying text.
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B. Aspiration
Unfortunately, there is less reason to be optimistic that a law school
code can accomplish broadly aspirational objectives. This is true for a
number of reasons. First, it is questionable whether general agreement
could be obtained on a broad set of principles and values that a law
school code should aspire to. As mentioned above, such widespread
agreement on controversial judgments regarding the fundamental
principles and values is most likely to occur in small homogeneous
communities.152 At first blush, it may seem like certain law schools
satisfy the criteria of being small and homogeneous communities.
However, as the profession itself is becoming increasingly diverse,153 the
same is true of law schools.154 Just as the effort to agree on a set of
broadly stated aspirations for the profession became outmoded in the
context of the codes governing the profession,155 the effort is likely to
meet a similar end in the context of law school codes.
Second, even to the extent that agreement could be reached on a set
of fundamental principles and values that should be aspired to in a law
school code, it is likely that such aspirations would have to be stated at
such a high level of generality that they would undermine the regulatory
purposes of the code.156 In general, at least two conditions are necessary
for successful regulatory implementation of broadly worded standards.
The first is a publicly available set of interpretations of the standard. Of
course, published judicial decisions serve this function with regard to
statutes, regulations, and common law rules that take the form of broadly
stated standards. These interpretations give content and meaning to the
standard and cure the problems created by the vagueness of the language
of the standard itself. Additionally, standards can only be effective
regulatory measures if there is some sort of precedent system so that the
previously mentioned decisions are somehow binding upon subsequent
decision makers. Otherwise, the decisions lose their ability to give
notice of the meaning of the standards. Again, such a system of
precedent (stare decisis) applies with regard to the judicial
interpretations of the types of standards mentioned above. It is far from
152. See supra notes 132-33. See also Wendel, supra note 32, at 1579.
153. See supra note 134, and accompanying text.
154. See Henderson, supra note 146, at 50. Indeed, as Berger and Berger point out in their
study of academic codes generally, “[f]ew students would think of their school, as they would think
of their fraternity or church, as a closely-knit membership body to which they belong.” Berger &
Berger, supra note 16, at 314.
155. See supra note 125, and accompanying text. See also Johnson, supra note 80, at 35-36.
156. See supra note 124, and accompanying text.
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clear, however, that either of these conditions apply in the context of law
school codes. First, as will be discussed in greater detail below, most
law school codes do not provide for published decisions in individual
cases.157 Additionally, it is also rarely the case that prior decisions under
law school codes provide any sort of binding precedent for future
decision makers under the code.158 While these conditions could be
changed,159 at the present time they provide strong impediments to the
ability of law school codes to serve an aspirational function.
Finally, there is reason to be skeptical of codes’ general ability to
serve as a tool for effectively serving broadly aspirational objectives.
Here, it is again useful to turn to the example of civility codes in legal
practice. For reasons discussed above, many view the more detailed
versions of such civility codes as a failure due to the tension between
their detailed, technical and mandatory language, and their broad
aspirations.160 Additionally, even with the more broadly stated honor
oaths or creeds that were adopted,161 a number of factors have served to
undermine their effectiveness. First, disagreement exists regarding the
fundamental purposes to be served by such codes.162 Second, the
language of such codes in many cases is so broad, it is virtually
meaningless.163 Third, such codes may cause confusion to the extent
that they overlap with the provisions of existing codes such as the Model
Rules.164 Fourth, the lack of meaningful sanctions for violation of such
codes likely lead many, if not most, attorneys to ignore them.165
Additionally, whether one agrees with these criticisms or not, it is hard
to argue that civility codes have had a major impact on the practice of
law.166 There are simply too many other factors that influence attorney
behavior for such non-binding, aspirational standards to have much

157. See infra notes 264-66, and accompanying text.
158. Id.
159. Indeed I will advocate for such changes below.
160. See supra notes 93-94, and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 90.
162. See Mashburn, supra note 86, at 657 (arguing that civility codes maintain traditional
hierarchies within the legal profession); Smith, supra note 86, at 151; Monroe Freedman, Kinder,
Gentler, But Not So Zealous, THE RECORDER, Aug. 23, 1995, at 8 (explaining how the application
of aspirational creeds undermines zealous representation of clients).
163. See Aaronson, supra note 112, at 114 & n.3.
164. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Civility Code May Lead to Less Civility, NAT’L L.J., Feb.
26, 1990, at 13. See also Moliterno, supra note 92, at 800; Smith, supra note 86, at 162-65.
165. See Aaronson, supra note 112, at 114-15. On the other hand, enforcement may equally
defeat the purposes of aspirational codes. Moliterno, supra note 92, at 801.
166. See Aaronson, supra note 112, at 113; Johnson, supra note 80, at 45; Smith, supra note
86, at 153.
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impact.167
The foregoing rather bleak analysis, however, should not lead to the
abandonment of all forms of aspiration from law school codes. Rather,
perhaps the best approach is to separate such aspirations from the
regulatory code of conduct itself and present them independently in the
form of an honor oath or pledge that compliments, rather than competes
with the regulatory aspects of the code. In addition to their presence in
the legal profession,168 such separate honor oaths or pledges are in use at
a number of academic institutions.169 Such oaths or pledges may indeed
have some psychological effectiveness in instilling the fundamental
values of the relevant professional or institutional group in the members
who take the oath.170 Moreover, because the language of such oaths
does not appear side by side with the provisions of the regulatory code,
the problem created by the tension between the oath’s broad, aspirational
language and the more specific, regulatory language of the code is
minimized. This is also the case with regard to a potential conflict
between the oath’s aspirational language and the sanctions available
under the code. The oath or pledge can retain its voluntary character, as
befits a broad, aspirational standard.
C. Education
Here, we must distinguish between different possible senses in
which a law school code might serve an educational function. The first,
discussed above,171 incorporates concrete examples into the code in
order to illustrate the code’s provisions. This seems like a relatively
modest educational objective and one that would be hard to oppose.
Concrete examples are likely to be particularly helpful with regard to
issues such as plagiarism, which, though familiar to students generally,
take on particular applications in the law school setting.172 Indeed, a
number of law school codes incorporate examples of this sort.173
167. Aaronson identifies pressures on attorneys of clients, finances, and time as some such
factors. Aaronson, supra note 112, at 116.
168. See supra note 90.
169. See DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note 11, at 63-64; Carlos, supra note 10, at 953.
170. See Moliterno, supra note 92, at 801 & n.159.
171. See supra notes 47-49, and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 116, and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., UNIV. OF ALA. LAW STUDENT HONOR CODE ch. 2.d., available at
http://www.law.ua.edu/students/info.php?re=honorcode (last visited Feb. 5, 2005); ARIZ. ST. UNIV.
COLL. OF LAW HONOR CODE §3(c), available at http://www.law.asu.edu/Files/StudentResources
/StudentPolicyManual/HonorCode.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2005); CAMPBELL UNIV., THE NORMAN
ADRIAN WIGGINS SCH. OF LAW CODE OF HONOR AND PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY art. III §2 (providing
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The second sense in which a law school code might be used for
educational purposes is as a teaching tool for instilling the moral and
ethical reasoning skills that we desire law students employ when they
become legal practitioners. Here, there is more reason to be skeptical of
codes’ ability to serve this function. In order for law school codes to be
effective teaching tools, law school teachers would in fact need to “teach
the code.” In other words, professors would need to incorporate
teaching the law school code into their traditional classes. However, my
sense is that law school codes are seldom if ever taught in this manner at
present. Moreover, law school professors are likely to have very little
appetite for incorporating law school codes into their courses.
Additionally, even to the extent that professors are willing to incorporate
law school codes into their teaching, there is reason to question whether
such codes would be very effective teaching tools for purposes of
fostering moral and ethical reasoning and analytic skills. To the extent
that such codes take the regulatory approach advocated here, teaching
such codes is likely to face the same criticism that merely teaching the
professional responsibility rules receives as a means toward advancing
ethical decision making.174 And, to the extent that codes are more
aspirational, there is still reason to question whether broadly aspirational
codes are themselves effective tools for the teaching of the principles
and values embodied in such codes.175 Finally, there is an increasing
consensus that effective legal ethics teaching requires situating ethical
decision making in contexts similar to those in which ethical decision
making will be undertaken in legal practice.176 However, the academic
context in which law school conduct codes are applied may be too
dissimilar from the legal practice context for experience in ethical
decision making in the former context to translate well to the latter
context.
A third sense in which a code might serve an educational function
involves the extent to which the law school code mirrors the codes that
will govern students’ conduct in their legal practice careers and/or
fosters roles within the student conduct system that provide training for
similar roles students might play in their legal practice careers (such as
honor court prosecutor, defender or judge). As indicated above,177
commentary), available at http://law.campbell.edu/Studentlife/honorcode.pdf (last visited Feb. 5,
2005).
174. See, e.g., Luban & Milleman, supra note 9, at 39.
175. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
176. See generally supra note 9.
177. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
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persons may differ in opinion as to the value to be served by similarities
between a law school code and the corresponding professional codes. In
any event, even to the extent that one perceives educational value in
such parallels, students are only likely to receive such benefits to the
extent of their involvement with the code. And, as discussed above,
since few if any professors actually “teach the code,” it is unlikely that
students will have widespread or extensive contact with the code
sufficient to foster learning based on its substance.
By contrast, those students who play important roles in the
administration of the code are likely to receive significant benefit from
that experience throughout their practice careers. For example, student
prosecutors and student defenders may gain valuable trial practice skills
that will come in handy in their later professional capacities. Student
judges may also receive good practice in legal reasoning that will serve
them well in their future legal careers. To the extent that student
disciplinary proceedings are open to the rest of the student body, similar
educational benefits may be available to those who observe the
proceedings, although to a much lesser degree than would be the case for
the actual participants in the proceedings. Yet a school’s ability to hold
open disciplinary proceedings may be limited by the provisions of the
Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),178 which allows for
the withholding of federal funds from educational institutions which fail
to preserve the confidentiality of “educational records.”179 On the other
hand, as will be discussed in greater detail below,180 FERPA’s
limitations on open disciplinary proceedings may be surmountable.
Nonetheless, for all of the reasons stated here, it seems reasonable to
expect only modest educational benefits to flow from a law school
conduct code.
VI. LAW SCHOOL CONDUCT CODES - SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
In light of the above discussion, it is possible to develop some
priorities for the drafting of a law school conduct code. First, the code
should take, as its overriding priority providing, a clear regulatory
regime for safeguarding the integrity of the basic academic functions of
teaching and evaluation. Next, the code should provide concrete
examples of how its provisions work, to serve the function of providing
education regarding the code’s provisions. The code should also allow
178. 20 U.S.C.S. §1232g (2002).
179. Bach, supra note 107, at 28; Bassler, supra note 104, at 230.
180. See infra notes 253-58 and accompanying text.
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students to play significant roles in the procedures designed to
administer and enforce the code and provide for as much openness in
those procedures as is allowable under the law. Because of the problems
created by combining broad, aspirational language with narrow
regulatory language, along with the reasons outlined above, the code
itself should be devoid of such language. However, rather than giving
up entirely on the aspirational function perhaps the best solution is to
supplement the law school conduct code with a relatively broadly stated
honor oath or pledge. The latter would not be enforceable, but would
embody the highest principles and values to which the law school stands.
Perhaps recitation of the honor pledge would become a part of the
orientation experience. In any event, keeping these priorities in mind,
attention will now be turned to the substantive and procedural aspects
that a code serving such priorities would encompass.
A. Substance
In terms of substance, it seems that the heart of a law school
conduct code should be relatively uncontroversial. It should include
provisions prohibiting familiar types of academic misconduct including
plagiarism, improper collaboration, exam cheating, and unduly
disruptive behavior. Two more controversial provisions that might be
included in a law school code are incorporation of the relevant attorney
code of professional responsibility and a non-toleration clause.
Additionally, a code must provide for sanctions in the event of its
violation.
1. Incorporation of Professional Responsibility Code
Some law school conduct codes incorporate by reference the
applicable code of attorney professional responsibility in the relevant
jurisdiction.181 Perhaps the decision whether to include an incorporation
provision sounds more momentous than it is. In fact, most of the
provisions included in an attorney code of professional responsibility
will have little or no applicability to the law school setting. Indeed, the
vast majority of the Rules contained in the Model Rules relate to
attorney client relationships or conduct undertaken by attorneys on
behalf of clients. The only provision of the Model Rules that likely
would be implicated frequently in a law school discipline context would
be Rule 8.4(c), which states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a
181. See supra note 116.
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lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation . . . .”182 While it seems that this provision alone
could form the basis for a broadly aspirational code, it also seems that
only confusion is likely to be spurred by incorporating numerous
provisions that have no direct application in the law school setting into a
law school conduct code. Language similar to that of Rule 8.4(c) could
be included without incorporating the rest of the Model Rules.
Nonetheless, doing so would be inconsistent with the priorities identified
here.
2. Non-toleration Clauses
The issue of a non-toleration clause is likely more controversial.
Non-toleration clauses require students to report instances of code
violations by other students, and subjects students who fail to report
misconduct to sanctions themselves.183 As mentioned above, the Model
Rules contain a non-toleration clause,184 and indeed such provisions
have long standing in the legal profession.185 However, non-toleration
clauses are often unpopular with those governed by them. Few people
like to be in the position of “snitch.”186 And the situation may be even
worse in the academic setting, as students are torn between their loyalty
to their fellow students and the requirements of the non-toleration
clause.187
In his thorough analysis of mandatory reporting provisions in the
legal profession, Arthur Greenbaum identifies the primary purposes
served by such non-toleration provisions.188 First, mandatory reporting
provisions may be a necessary correlate to the self-regulatory aspect of
lawyer ethics and disciplinary systems.189 Second, mandatory reporting
requirements may enhance the legal profession’s public image.190 Third,
182. The Model Rules also include a “non-toleration” clause, which requires attorneys to report
misconduct by other attorneys. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 8.3 (2002) While this
provision would be relevant in a law school discipline setting, such provisions will be discussed
below. See infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text.
183. DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note 11, at 76-77; Carlos, supra note 10, at 960.
184. See supra note 182.
185. See Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney’s Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A
Roadmap for Reform, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 261 (2003). Indeed, all but two states,
Kentucky and California, have adopted some sort of mandatory reporting requirement. Id. at 262
n.9.
186. DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note 11, at 77 n.174.
187. Id.
188. Greenbaum, supra note 185, at 263-64.
189. Id. at 264.
190. Id. at 267-68.
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mandatory reporting may enhance lawyer professionalism.191 Finally,
mandatory reporting may be justified to the extent that it uncovers
misconduct more efficiently than other means.192
Of all of these possible justifications, only the latter seems to apply
to law school codes.193 With regard to that justification, it does seem
quite likely that students are in the best position to detect violations of
the code by classmates, and that student reporting is more likely to lead
to discovery of code violations than any other source. The increase in
the number of violations discovered, however, must be balanced against
likely widespread disregard for the reporting requirement, for reasons
stated above. Then, the question is one of willingness to enforce
rigorously the requirement. Indeed, in the legal practice context, bar
authorities have been unwilling to do so, with only two known cases in
which a lawyer has been punished for failing to report misconduct by
another lawyer.194 But while there may be good reasons to have a
mandatory reporting provision in the legal practice context, even if that
provision is not going to be rigidly enforced,195 this is unlikely the case
with regard to an academic code. Indeed, having a code provision that is
widely ignored, especially in an area likely to be highly controversial, as
non-toleration codes are, would only serve to undermine the seriousness
with which the entire code is taken. For this reason, I recommend
against inclusion of a non-toleration provision in a law school code. Of
course, this does not mean that students will not be permitted to report
code violations or indeed encouraged to do so. Indeed many students
will see that their own interests are served by efforts to deter misconduct
by fellow students, and it is expected that most violations will continue
to be reported by students. However, students should not themselves be
subject to discipline for failing to report code violations.
3. Sanctions
A final issue that should be addressed with regard to the substance
of the code are the sanctions that are available for the code’s violation.
Typical sanctions include oral or written reprimand, temporary or
191. Id. at 268-69.
192. Id. at 271.
193. However, in their analysis of academic codes, DiMatteo & Wiesner analogize students to
professionals. See DiMateo & Wiesner, supra note 11, at 61. Given that analogy, some of the
justifications for non-toleration clauses that relate to notions of professionalism might seem to
apply. Indeed, DiMatteo & Wiesner endorse the concept of non-toleration clauses. Id. at 75-81.
194. Greenbaum, supra note 185, at 272-73 & n.65.
195. Id. at 274.
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permanent notation of the violation in the student’s law school record,
probation, suspension, expulsion, community service, and some impact
upon the student’s grade in the course in which the misconduct
occurred.196 Sanctions which relate to students’ grades seem somewhat
problematic, as they intrude upon what is traditionally regarded the
province of the course professor to determine students’ grades.
However, in some cases, it does seem that merely giving no credit on an
assignment, or reducing a grade, might be an appropriate sanction for
certain types of misconduct. The notion of non-permanent or private
reprimands also raises some questions because in virtually every state in
the country, both students and law schools are under an obligation to
report academic misconduct to bar authorities in conjunction with
application for admission to the bar.197 Thus, even if the notation of the
violation is removed from the student’s record, the duty to report
remains. Naturally, the exact manner in which this plays out depends on
the specific language employed by bar authorities in framing their
reporting duty. For example, in California, bar applicants are required to
disclose whether they have “ever been dropped, suspended, expelled, or
otherwise disciplined by any school for any reason other than academic
performance.”198 This wording seems to require reporting of even the
mildest of sanctions, adding a degree of severity to the sanctions for
even minor misconduct. Of course, it seems unlikely that minor law
school misconduct would have much of an impact on bar admission;
whereas, serious misconduct likely should be considered in the bar
admission process.
B. Procedure
It seems that most of the writing that has been done to date
regarding academic codes has focused to a large extent on the
procedures that such codes require in implementing the code’s
substantive provisions.199 Perhaps this is due in part to the fact that most
196. See Carlos, supra note 10, at 969.
197. Id. at 973-74.
198. The Committee of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of California, Office of Admissions,
Application for Determination of Moral Character, at 13, available at http://calbar.ca.
gov/calbar/pdfs/admissions/Moral-Character/adm_app_moral-character_1003.pdf (last visited Feb.
5, 2005).
199. See, e.g., Bach, supra note 107, at 12-30; DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note 11, at 84-96;
Karla H. Fox, Due Process and Student Academic Misconduct, 25 AM. BUS. L. J. 671 (1988);
Douglas R. Richmond, Students’ Right to Counsel in University Disciplinary Proceedings, 15 J.
COLL. & UNIV. L. 289 (1989); Paul Rosenthal, Speak Now: The Accused Student’s Right to Remain
Silent in Public University Disciplinary Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1241 (1997); Bassler,
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of the judicial decisions that have reviewed student disciplinary
proceedings have focused on matters of procedural due process.200
Because much has already been written on this subject, this article will
not attempt to provide a detailed analysis of the legal requirements for
the procedural aspects of academic codes. Additionally, perhaps not
surprisingly, law school codes tend to provide at least as much in the
way of procedural due process protections, as is the case with regard to
other types of academic codes.201 Also, because, as demonstrated below,
the legal requirements for the procedural aspects of such codes are in
fact, extremely minimal, it makes sense to focus more attention on the
normative question of what the procedural components of a good law
school code ought to be. But first, a brief review of the legal landscape.
Naturally, the first question that must be addressed in determining
what procedures a law school code must include is whether the law
school in question is a public or private institution. This is because there
is no question that the procedural due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution apply to public
or state sponsored law schools.202 The seminal case that is often cited as
first recognizing this principle is Dixon v. Alabama,203 in which the Fifth
Circuit found that students in good standing at a state sponsored
university had a constitutionally recognized liberty and/or property
interest in remaining enrolled at the school, and therefore, had a right to
notice and a hearing before being dismissed.204 The United States
supra note 104, at 215-20; Carlos, supra note 10, at 944-52.
200. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Dixon v. Ala. St. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d
150 (5th Cir. 1961).
201. In their article reviewing undergraduate conduct codes, Professors Berger and Berger set
forth the results of their admittedly “unscientific survey” of such codes regarding the procedural due
process protections provided to students accused of code violations. Berger & Berger, supra note
16, at 297-99. In writing this article, this author conducted an even more “unscientific” review of
the conduct codes of 77 of the 188 (slightly more than 40%) ABA approved U.S. law schools. Id.
The codes reviewed here were selected on a relatively “random” basis, namely, which schools had
posted their codes to their school websites in such a manner that they were easily “downloadable”
by my research assistant. Id. It does appear, nonetheless, that the codes reviewed here come from a
fairly representative cross section of the totality of ABA approved schools. Id. And with regard to
each of the procedural protections surveyed by Berger and Berger, it appears that at least as high a
percentage of law school codes provide that procedural protection, as was the case with regard to
the undergraduate codes surveyed by Berger and Berger. Id.
202. “. . . nor shall any State deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
203. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
204. Id. at 157. The students in Dixon were expelled for conduct relating to efforts to
desegregate a courthouse lunchroom in Alabama in 1960. Id. at 152 n.3. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the students were expelled without any prior notice of the charges against them or
hearing whatsoever. Id. at 154.
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Supreme Court upheld this notion in the later case of Goss v. Lopez,205
while at the same time indicating that all the process due to students in
the public school disciplinary context is “some kind of notice and . . .
some kind of hearing.”206 While subsequent courts have struggled to
define the contours of the notice207 and hearing208 requirements imposed
by the Court, it seems quite clear that the Constitutional standard
imposes at most very minimal requirements on the drafters of law school
codes.209
At first blush it would seem that even fewer procedural due process
requirements would apply to private law schools, in the absence of the
state action required to render the Fourteenth Amendment applicable.210
However, a number of theories have been applied to impose upon
private schools similar procedural due process requirements to those that
apply to public schools. First, it has been argued that because many
private universities receive federal financial assistance, are heavily
regulated, and engage in a variety of projects with government entities,
such universities are “state actors” for purposes of due process analysis.
However, such arguments have been rejected.211 Students have relied
more successfully on contract theories to impose procedural due process
type requirements on private universities.212 Because the relationship
between student and university is contractual in nature, certain

205. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). The liberty interest involved in Goss was to a free public education,
which the State of Ohio provided for by statute in the circumstances of that case. Id. at 567.
206. Id. at 579. Goss involved ten-day suspensions from public high schools for students
involved in a variety of protest activities. Id. at 569-71. The students were suspended without any
prior notice or a hearing regarding the charges against them. Id. at 568.
207. See Jaska v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (six weeks’
notice of hearing was adequate), aff’d 787 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1986); Bleicker v. Bd. of Tr. of Ohio,
485 F. Supp. 1381 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (refusing preliminary injunction against academic discipline
even though plaintiff only received three days’ notice of initial hearing).
208. See Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 204 (2d Cir. 1972), overruled in part and on
other grounds by Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974) (overruling Second Circuit’s
determination that preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate where cadet is dismissed from West
Point Military Academy without procedural due process); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807,
812 (2d Cir. 1967); Henderson State Univ. v. Spadoni, 848 S.W.2d 951 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993).
209. See, e.g., Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 663-64 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating there is no
right to cross examine witnesses in academic disciplinary hearing); Wasson, 382 F.2d at 812
(finding there is no right to counsel in academic disciplinary proceeding); Bleicker, 485 F. Supp. at
1384, 1387 (stating that three days notice of honor code violation was adequate).
210. See, e.g., Swanson v. Welsey College, 402 A.2d 401, 403 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979)
(determining that there is no state action in provision of education by private college).
211. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Beilis v. Albany Med. Coll., 525
N.Y.S.2d 932, 934 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (holding that state financial assistance does not make
medical school a “state actor” for constitutional purposes).
212. See, e.g., Berger & Berger, supra note 16, at 289-94; Carlos, supra note 10, at 943-44.
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documents, such as student handbooks detailing disciplinary procedures,
may be viewed as being express parts of the contract between student
and university.213 In such circumstances, the contract may provide for
greater214 or lesser due process protections than would be provided under
the Constitution.215 The law of associations has also been looked to as a
source of due process type rights for students regarding disciplinary
proceedings.216 However, in addition to adding legal force to provisions
already adopted by the school, such theories have at most created a
prohibition against arbitrary, unreasonable or bad faith discipline of a
student.217
An additional distinction must be noted between actions taken
against students for academic reasons and those taken for disciplinary
reasons.218 The cases cited in support of the previous discussion deal
exclusively with sanctions imposed against students for disciplinary type
violations. While, as noted above, courts’ review of a school’s actions
in such circumstances is limited, courts are willing to take a fairly hard
look to ensure that, at a minimum, the school has followed its own
adopted procedures for addressing the disciplinary charge. This is not
surprising, given the fact that determining whether a school’s quasijudicial procedures have been followed, as well as whether the evidence
presented to the school supports the finding that the alleged misconduct
occurred, are well within the core competencies of courts of law. By
contrast, where the question involved relates to assessments of the
quality of academic performance, courts are far from their core
competencies, and the desire to defer to professorial determinations of
academic performance is great.219 In such circumstances, courts will at
most review the institution’s decision to dismiss or otherwise sanction a
student for inadequate academic performance for arbitrariness.220
213. See, e.g., Cloud v. Tr. of Boston Univ., 720 F.2d 721, 724 (1st Cir. 1983); Slaughter v.
Brigham Young Univ., 514 F2d 622, 626 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898 (1975);
Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238 (D. Vt. 1994); Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F.
Supp. 1060, 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1977), aff’d, 579 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1978); Harvey v. Palmer Coll. of
Chiropractic, 363 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 427 N.Y.S.2d 760
(N.Y. 1980); Beilis, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 933.
214. Berger & Berger, supra note 16, at 291.
215. See Jansen, 440 F. Supp. at 1062.
216. Tedeschi, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
217. Harvey, 363 N.W.2d at 444. See also Anderson v. Mass. Inst. Tech., No. 94-0348, 1995
WL 813188, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 1985).
218. Berger & Berger refer to this distinction as being between “academic failure” and
“academic wrongdoing.” Berger & Berger, supra note 16, at 302.
219. Id.
220. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 222 (1985); Bd. of Curators of
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In any event, the above discussion makes clear that law schools
have a great deal of latitude in determining the procedures to be
employed under their conduct codes.
The following are some
suggestions for such procedures.
1. Notice
As discussed above, adequate notice of the charges against a person
is one of the fundamental requirements of due process.221 However, the
formulation of the notice to give students regarding the alleged violation
should be relatively uncontroversial, provided it cites to the provisions
of the code the student is accused of violating and makes some reference
to the conduct alleged to have violated the code. Though some
controversy has surrounded the question of how much notice is enough
for due process purposes,222 fairness would seem to require at least
enough notice for a person to be able to prepare adequately for any
hearing in the matter.
A perhaps more controversial issue surrounds what access the
accused student should have to the evidence that will be presented
against her or him in adjudication of the alleged code violation. Courts
have not generally found a right to formal discovery in academic
disciplinary proceedings unless such a right is provided for in the
school’s adopted procedures.223 However, discovery is now a hallmark
of our civil justice system,224 and to the extent that it is desirable that law
school conduct codes embody similar procedures to those employed in
legal practice,225 discovery should be made available in law school
disciplinary proceedings as well. Additionally, fundamental fairness
would seem to dictate that the ability to respond effectively to charges
presented at a hearing would require some advance knowledge of the

the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); Susan M. v. N.Y. Law Sch., 556 N.E.2d 1104,
1107 (N.Y. 1990).
221. See supra note 206.
222. In Goss, the Court used the unfortunate language that “[t]here need be no delay between
the time ‘notice’ is given and the time of the hearing.” 419 U.S. at 582. Of course, a literal
interpretation of that language would eviscerate the notice requirement entirely. But courts have
found that relatively minimal notice will be adequate. See, e.g., Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d at
661-62 (finding that four days’ notice of hearing was adequate); Bleicker v. Bd. of Tr. of Ohio, 485
F. Supp. at 1387 (finding that three days’ notice of hearing was adequate).
223. See Nash, 812 F.2d at 661-62 (finding no right of accused to access statements of
witnesses testifying against him at hearing).
224. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
225. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
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evidence that the accused will be called upon to respond to.226
A subsidiary issue regards whether the accused should be informed
initially of the identity of the person who made the accusation. While
the question is likely to be less controversial if a faculty member or other
officer of the school is involved, it seems like a question of substantial
significance where, as in a large proportion of cases, the accusation is
made by a fellow student. Anonymity is likely to result in a higher
incidence of reporting, although it might be contended that anonymity
may lead to frivolous reports. In any event, in the interests of protecting
students reporting other students’ misconduct, it seems that anonymity
should be maintained at least until the disciplinary process moves past a
preliminary stage.227 However, by the time formal hearing procedures
are reached, fairness would dictate that the accused need be made aware
of the evidence against her or him,228 including, the identity of the
person who made the complaint.
2. The Hearing
Whereas, the above-described cases make clear that some sort of
hearing must be accorded law school students in conjunction with
disciplinary proceedings, the specific form of the hearing lies within the
wide discretion of those drafting the code.229 At one end of the
226. Virtually all of the commentators on the issue advocate for some opportunity for the
accused to review the evidence and witnesses that will be presented against them at the hearing on
the matter. See, e.g., Berger & Berger, supra note 16, at 351; DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note 11,
at 89; Carlos, supra note 10, at 946-49.
227. Some academic codes provide very detailed preliminary investigative procedures to
determine whether charges of violations of the code should go forward. Carlos, supra note 10, at
966 & n.266. Some even go so far as providing for a “probable cause” hearing, in order to
determine if a full and final hearing should go forward. Id. at 966 & n.267. However, given the
relative informality that is permitted with regard to the final hearing to be provided in academic
disciplinary contexts, providing for an additional probable cause hearing seems excessive. See
supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text. Additionally, both the student and the institution have
an interest in having allegations of misconduct resolved as expeditiously as possible. See Berger &
Berger, supra note 16, at 345. Nonetheless, it does seem perfectly appropriate that some sort of
preliminary investigation be conducted before an accusation of a code violation goes to a full
hearing. No student should be required to go through a full hearing unless it is determined that there
is some degree of merit to the allegation of wrongdoing. However, it is this author’s view that
student prosecutors and their faculty advisor are well suited to make such a “probable cause”
determination without the need for an additional hearing. See infra notes 239-40 and accompanying
text.
228. See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
229. In cases involving public schools, courts have sometimes looked to the Supreme Court’s
now familiar formulation from Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-36 (1976), for determining
what process is due in cases involving possible deprivations of constitutionally protected liberty or
property interests. See, e.g., Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 1988); Nash v.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss4/8

38

Berenson: What Should Law School Student Conduct Codes Do?
BERENSON1.DOC

2005]

5/2/2005 8:59:42 AM

WHAT SHOULD LAW SCHOOL STUDENT CONDUCT CODES DO?

841

continuum of possibilities lies a full-blown trial type proceeding.230 One
possible advantage of this type of proceeding relates to the educational
function of the code. To the extent that law students are likely to be
involved in trial work in the future, holding similar trials in code
violation proceedings might help to prepare students for their future
endeavors. This would be particularly true for students playing a role in
such proceedings, such as student prosecutors, defenders, judges or
courtroom officials. If such proceedings were open to the student body,
even those merely observing the proceedings might obtain some
educational benefit.
In addition to the educational benefits of full-blown adversarial
hearings in law school disciplinary contexts, such proceedings might be
most consistent by placing the priority upon the regulatory function of
the code. In other words, to the extent that the primary purpose of a law
school code is to prevent and punish academic misconduct, full-blown
trial proceedings might be the most effective way to determine if such
Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d at 660. Under that formulation, the court is required to balance the
following factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
[g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. (quoting Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335). Applying these standards, courts have come up with a
flexible approach, that may require more or less formal hearing procedures depending on what is at
stake for the students involved. For example, in Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme Court intimated that a
more formal hearing might have been required had the students in that case faced suspensions of
longer than ten days. 419 U.S. at 584. As one court stated, in the academic discipline context,
“[f]lexibility and elbow room are to be preferred over specificity.” DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note
11, at 91 (quoting Henderson State Univ. v. Spadoni, 848 S.W.2d at 953.
230. Marin v. Univ. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613 (D.P.R. 1974), represents the high water mark
for procedural due process protections in the academic discipline context. Marin involved
suspension for more than one year of two students who engaged in a variety of protest activities
regarding the conduct of student elections at the University of Puerto Rico. Id. at 617-18. The
Court ruled that in the circumstances, a constitutionally permissible hearing for the students would
involve:
(1) adequate advance notice to the student of (a) the charges, (b) the specific, previously
promulgated regulations under which the charges are brought, and (c) the evidence
against the student; (2) a full, expedited evidentiary hearing (a) presided over by an
impartial, previously uninvolved official, (b) the proceedings of which are transcribed, at
which the student (c) can present evidence and (d) cross-examine opposing witnesses, (e)
with the assistance of retained counsel; and (3) a written decision by the presiding
official encompassing (a) findings of fact, (b) the substantial evidence on which the
findings rest, and (c) reasons for the conclusion.
Id. at 623. As the previous discussion indicates, no other court has been willing to go nearly so far
as the Marin court in formalizing the hearing procedures required in an academic disciplinary
context.
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misconduct has in fact occurred and to determine the appropriate
sanction in the event that it has. Of course, whether adversarial
proceedings are in fact the best way to serve these functions is subject to
vigorous debate.231 But in any event, it seems likely that students faced
with serious allegations of academic misconduct with serious potential
sanctions, up to and including expulsion, are likely to perceive formal,
trial-like proceedings as fairer than less formal alternatives. This fact
also militates in favor of more formal proceedings.
However, other values implicated in the law school context might
weigh in favor of proceedings lying much closer to the informal end of
the continuum of possible types of proceedings. First, adversary trials
have been criticized as an ineffective means of determining the “truth”
about what happened with regard to alleged wrongdoing.232 Yet, it seems
that the “truth finding” function might be a more important aspect of law
school disciplinary proceedings than is the case with the typical civil or
criminal trial. Secondly, “[s]ome educators . . . view the disciplinary
process not as a forum to determine guilt or innocence or to impose
sanctions, but rather as an instructional vehicle allowing students to gain
wisdom and better judgment from their mistakes.”233 And students may
be more likely to acknowledge and learn from wrongdoing in a setting
where the allegations are resolved through a cooperative process, rather
than in a setting where a resolution is imposed upon the student
adversarially. Additionally, given that student misconduct may harm
other students as well as the institution, and given the importance of
such student-to-student relationships to the success of the institution, it
might well be that informal, non-adversarial (or cooperative) resolutions
of disciplinary charges are more important to the well-being of academic
institutions than is the case regarding the typical civil or criminal trial.
Of course, efforts to resolve disputes non-adversarially are not
necessarily incompatible with the availability of full blown adversarial
proceedings at some point in the process.234 Indeed, most alternative
231. See infra note 232.
232. Perhaps the most effective version of this critique appears in DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS
AND JUSTICE 68 (Princeton Univ. Press 1988). Luban also critiques other justifications for the
current American version of adversarial trial proceedings, including the protection of individual
legal rights, id. at 74, and the protection of human dignity. Id. at 85. Luban finds all of these
justifications for the adversary system in its current form to be wanting but in the end approves of
the adversary system on the “pragmatic” grounds that the system appears to be no worse than the
other alternatives that might replace it in terms of discovering truth and protecting legal rights, and
therefore, the transaction costs involved in moving to a new system would not be justified. Id. at
92.
233. Berger & Berger, supra note 16, at 340.
234. Though a contrary example is provided by the collaborative divorce movement, in which
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dispute resolution takes place in a context where trials are ultimately
available if the cooperative efforts fail. Due to the educational and
fairness aspects discussed above in conjunction with formal adversarial
proceedings, such proceedings should remain available under law school
codes. However, a variety of less formal means leading up to such
proceedings should be employed in an effort to resolve law school
disciplinary matters cooperatively.
Two subsidiary issues regarding the scope of the hearing afforded a
person accused of a code violation which merit brief mention are the
possible rights of cross-examination and representation by counsel. Not
surprisingly, given the limited nature of the due process protections
available at such hearings, neither “right” has been uniformly held to be
constitutionally required in the academic disciplinary context. It has not
generally been held that there is a right to cross-examination in student
disciplinary proceedings.235 And while courts have divided over
whether there is a right to counsel in academic disciplinary proceedings,
Nonetheless, most
most hold that there is no such right.236
commentators suggest that both be provided in the academic disciplinary
context,237 and most law school codes presently provide for such
rights.238 To the extent that, as suggested above, an appropriate goal of a
the parties to dissolution of marriage proceedings sign an agreement to resolve the matter through
negotiation and agree to retain new counsel if the collaborative process does not succeed and resort
is ultimately had to the courts. See Marsha Baucom, Collaborative Divorce, ORANGE COUNTY
LAWYER 18 (July 1999).
235. See Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d at 664.
236. Compare Marin v. Univ. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. at 623 (stating that due process requires
right to counsel), Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (finding same), and
French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (E.D. La. 1969), appeal dismissed, 425 F.2d 182 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 941 (1970) (stating that due process is denied by refusing students
counsel of their choice), with Henson v. Honor Comm. of U. Va., 719 F.2d 69, 73 (4th Cir. 1983)
(finding that a law student had no right to counsel in disciplinary proceedings), Rustad v. U.S. Air
Force, 718 F.2d 348, 350 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding that Air Force Academy cadets have no right to
counsel in disciplinary proceedings), Madera v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F.2d 778; 780 (2d Cir. 1967)
(finding no right to counsel), Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d at 812 (finding no right to counsel),
Due v. Fla. Agric. & Mech. Univ., 233 F.Supp. 396, 403 (N.D. Fla. 1963) (finding no due process
right to counsel for accused student), and Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 236-37 (S.D.W.Va.
1968) (finding no right to counsel).
237. See Bach, supra note 107, at 20 (cross examination) and 23 (right to counsel); Berger &
Berger, supra note 16, at 338 (right to counsel) and 346 (right to cross examine); DiMatteo &
Wiesner, supra note 11, at 92 (recommending right to cross-examination); Carlos, supra note 10, at
949-950 (advocating right to counsel). But See DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note 11, at 93
(suggesting that there is no need for a right to counsel in a “well-structured student-run Honor
System in which the accused is given notice and a hearing, along with the right to cross-examine
adverse witnesses . . .”).
238. See, e.g., THE DRAKE U. SCH. OF LAW CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT §E.3(f)-(g),
available at http://www.law.drake.edu/students/codeofstudentconduct.pdf (last visited Dec. 19,
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law school student conduct system is to have a final proceeding that
closely resembles a full blown trial, it follows that both a right to crossexamination and a right to counsel should be provided. However, if
another goal is to maximize educational potential, as well as substantive
fairness by having significant student involvement in the system,239 then
perhaps the default rule should be to provide for student prosecutors and
defenders, who will generally serve as counsel during the proceedings,
with the assistance, in preparation at least, of an experienced faculty
supervisor. However, given the stakes involved, the accused student
should also have the right to retain an actual lawyer to represent him/her
in the proceedings should he/she desire to do so.240
Another question relating to the hearing provided to students under
the code is the standard of proof that should be required to find a code
violation. Even assuming that student disciplinary proceedings will
approach typical legal proceedings in terms of formality, there remain a
number of possible choices regarding the quantum of proof required to
find a code violation. Of course, the familiar options are the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard used in criminal proceedings,241 the clear and
convincing evidence standard utilized in, among other contexts,
professional licensing disputes,242 civil commitment proceedings,243 and
2003); U. OF MINN. LAW SCH. HONOR CODE §4.06(b)(2)-(3), available at
http://www.law.umn.edu/current/honor.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005); SMU, DEDMAN SCH. OF
LAW STUDENT CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY § IX(A) & (F), available at
http://www.law.smu.edu/lawschool/scode.shtm#HEARING (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
239. Some academic codes provide for, and some commentators advocate for a student conduct
system that is almost completely student run. See Carlos, supra note 10, at 957-59 & nn.202-209.
However, while significant student involvement in the code is essential for educational as well as
legitimacy and fairness reasons, there are a number of reasons why significant faculty or
administrative involvement is desirable as well. First, students may lack the expertise, experience,
and judgment necessary to adjudicate successfully alleged code violations on their own. Second,
given students’ limited temporal relationship to the institution, professional involvement is
necessary to ensure that long term institutional interests are protected. Along similar lines, if
student conduct systems are to adopt the type of precedential system that is advocated below, then
some limitation on turnover of personnel within the system will be desirable. See infra notes 26466 and accompanying text. Finally, professors and administrators also often have a large stake in
the outcome of student conduct code proceedings. Thus, what is advocated here is a hybrid system,
which includes significant involvement in the code by both students and professionals within the
institution.
240. Though some commentators decry the imbalance created by a situation where student
prosecutors are opposed by actual defense attorneys, see Carlos, supra note 10, at 951, of course
providing such “advantages” for defendants is a hallmark of our criminal justice system and is not
out of place in an academic disciplinary proceeding where the consequences to the accused if
convicted may be similarly grave.
241. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 358-59 (1970).
242. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, Rule 18(c)
(1996).
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termination of parental rights cases,244 the preponderance of the evidence
standard used in most civil cases,245 or the lesser substantial evidence
standard used in many administrative contexts.246 Given the abovedescribed jurisprudence regarding the requirements of due process in the
academic disciplinary context,247 it is not surprising that courts have held
that schools are not required to impose a higher burden of proof than the
substantial evidence standard.248 However, numerous schools have
chosen to impose more stringent standards, even up to the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard.249 Given the stakes involved and the possible
severity of the sanctions imposed in law school disciplinary contexts, it
seems that a standard of at least a preponderance of the evidence or
maybe even the clear and convincing standard would be appropriate,
although the beyond a reasonable doubt standard would likely require
too much in the way of proof for most disciplinary charges.
Another question that needs to be discussed is whether hearings
under the student conduct code should be open or closed. As has been
suggested already, there are a number of benefits that flow from open
hearings. First, the code’s educational function is served by allowing the
largest possible segment of the student population to observe
proceedings under the code. Additionally, given that “sunlight is the
best disinfectant,”250 proceedings under the code are likely to function
better, and more fairly to all of the parties concerned, if they are
conducted in full view of the members of the entire law school
community. Finally, the code’s deterrent function is likely to be
improved by the greater awareness of the code achieved through greater
student knowledge fostered by open code proceedings.
On the other hand, legitimate interests are served by closed
hearings. Both the accused and the accuser have privacy concerns that
militate in favor of closed hearings. It is quite likely that an accused
243. See, e.g., In Re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 1981) and cases cited therein.
244. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 752-57 (1982).
245. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003) (noting that “conventional
rule of civil litigation,” the preponderance of the evidence standard, generally applies in cases under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
246. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. §706(2)(E) (West 2002).
247. See supra notes 199-220 and accompanying text.
248. See Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 646 F. Supp. at 813.
249. See DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note 11, at 94; Fox, supra note 199, at 686-87 n.108;
Carlos, supra note 10, at 967.
250. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (quoting L. Brandeis, Other People’s Money
62 (National Home Library Foundation ed. 1933)) (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for
social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman.”).
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student who is subsequently exonerated would prefer that the
proceedings had been closed to the rest of the student body. However,
an effective pre-hearing investigatory procedure,251 should prevent nonmeritorious cases from going to a hearing. Similarly, for reasons also
discussed prior,252 anonymity for complainants under the code may lead
toward more numerous and better supported reports of code violations.
The FERPA may tip the balance between open and closed hearings.
As mentioned previously,253 FERPA provides for the withholding of
federal financial assistance from academic institutions that fail to protect
the privacy of certain “education records.”254 Some disagreement exists
as to whether documents relating to academic disciplinary proceedings
fall within the definition of education records in the statute,255 let alone
whether the disciplinary proceedings themselves constitute education
records. Nonetheless, the more recent and better reasoned decisions
conclude that academic disciplinary records do fall within the statute’s
purview,256 and that position is consistent with the Federal Department
of Education’s interpretation of the statute.257 However, FERPA does
251. See supra note 227.
252. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 178-79.
254. 20 U.S.C.S. §1232g(b). See Bassler, supra note 104, at 230.
255. The statute defines education records as “those records, files, documents, and other
materials which (i) contain information directly related to a student; and (ii) are maintained by an
educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution.” 20 U.S.C.S.
§1232g(a)(4)(A). Certainly, a plain language interpretation of the definition would appear to
include academic disciplinary records. Accord United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 812
(6th Cir. 2002). Nonetheless, courts are divided on the issue. See Caledonian-Record Publ’g Co.,
Inc. v. Vt. State Coll., 833 A.2d 1273, 1276-77 (Vt. 2003) (citing cases). The Vermont Supreme
Court in Caledonian-Record found it unnecessary to decide the question of whether academic
disciplinary records are covered by FERPA, holding that such records were barred from disclosure
under the Vermont Public Records Act. Id. However, in many instances, the federal statute’s
incentive for confidentiality may appear to conflict with state law requirements for disclosure under
either state open meeting laws or state public records acts. See Bassler, supra note 104, at 233. In
circumstances where courts see a direct conflict between federal and state law, of course, the federal
law trumps. See, e.g., Rim of the World Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11,
12 (Cal. App. 2002) (stating that FERPA’s confidentiality provisions trump state law requiring
disclosure of records relating to student expulsions); DTH Publ’g Co. v. Univ. of N. C., 496 S.E.2d
8, 12 (N.C. App. 1998) (stating that FERPA trumps state open meeting law). On the other hand,
because FERPA does not require academic institutions to do anything, but rather, merely provides
for the withholding of funds from schools that violate its provisions, other courts have viewed the
statute as not directly conflicting with state statutes that require disclosure. See Caledonian-Record,
833 A.2d at 1276-77 (citing cases). Finally, some state disclosure laws specifically exempt from
disclosure documents are deemed to be confidential under Federal law. See Miami Univ., 294 F.3d
at 811 (noting that Ohio Public Records Act does not compel disclosure of records where release is
prohibited by Federal law).
256. See, e.g., Miami Univ., 294 F.3d at 797; Rim of the World, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11.
257. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d at 813 n.14 (citing 60 F.R. 3464, 3465 (1995)). See also Bassler,
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provide a couple of exceptions to its financial incentive against
disclosure, the most pertinent being that a student may consent to
disclosure of records that would otherwise be considered “private” under
the statute.258
This author contends that the benefits of open disciplinary
proceedings outweigh any negative consequences that may result from
such openness. However, both the FERPA and the involved students’
privacy interests seem to make an automatic rule requiring open hearings
implausible. Thus, the code should state a preference for open hearings,
and student prosecutors should be encouraged to seek the consent of
both the accused and the accuser for an open hearing. However, both
the accused and the accuser should have the opportunity under the code
to choose a closed hearing if that is their desire.
3. Post Hearing Procedures
Most academic conduct codes provide for some type of review of
the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding.259 While some law school
codes provide for an actual appellate tribunal,260 others simply provide
for review of the proceeding by the law school Dean261 or the full
faculty.262 It is this writer’s view that if all of the above safeguards are
applied to the initial disciplinary proceeding, review by the Dean is more
than adequate to ensure that there was no miscarriage of justice in the
original proceeding. Of course, in order to allow for a thorough review
supra note 104, at 232.
258. §1232g(d). FERPA also provides an exception for “the final results of any disciplinary
proceeding conducted by [an] institution against a student who is an alleged perpetrator of any
crime of violence . . . or a nonforcible sex offense, if the institution determines . . . that the student
committed a violation of the institution’s rules or policies with respect to such crime or offense.”
Id. at §1232g(b)(6)(B).
259. See Carlos, supra note 10, at 969 & n.293.
260. See, e.g., NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIV., SHEPARD BROAD SCH. OF LAW HONOR CODE art.
VI, available at http://www.nsulaw.nova.edu/students/documents/honorcode00.pdf (last visited Feb.
5, 2005); SETON HALL UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT §9, available at
http://law.shu.edu/administration/student_services/honor_code/review_by_council.html (last visited
Feb. 5, 2005).
261. See, e.g., UNIV. OF ARIZ. JAMES E. ROGERS COLL. OF LAW HONOR CODE §7, available at
http://www.law.arizona.edu/Students/pdf/StudentHandbook.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2005); STETSON
UNIV. COLL. OF LAW CODE OF STUDENT PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY art. III, §4(i), available at
http://www.law.stetson.edu/studentlife/handbook/2000/policies.htm#art1 (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
262. See, e.g., YESHIVA UNIV. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCH. OF LAW DISCIPLINARY CODE,
RULES AND PROCEDURES art. IV, available at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/current
_students/pdf/handbk03.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2005); WILLAMETTE UNIV. COLL. OF LAW
STUDENT HANDBOOK §VII, available at http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/students/law_handbook.
pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
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of the proceedings, the institution should audio or videotape the
proceedings and allow the student to transcribe the proceedings at her or
his own expense if the student desires the record to be reviewed at that
level of detail.263
Additionally, decisions of the conduct code tribunal should be in
writing and should be made available to the law school’s student body.
Additionally, such decisions should be given at least some precedential
value in future conduct code proceedings. Somewhat surprisingly, such
procedures are not presently followed at most schools. As mentioned
above, to the extent that a school adopts a broadly aspirational code,
with very general language, making decisions interpreting the code
available is an essential step in adequately defining how the code’s very
generally language will be applied in particular contexts.264 However,
even to the extent that a detailed regulatory code is adopted, published
decisions provide a number of salutary consequences. First, such
decisions help to educate students as to conduct that is and is not
permitted under the code. Second, to the extent that such decisions are
given at least some precedential weight in future conduct code
proceedings, the prior decisions will help to ensure consistency in the
treatment of similar conduct over time. Such consistency is particularly
difficult to achieve in academic disciplinary contexts, given the turnover
in the personnel involved with the conduct code, including key student
participants such as code prosecutors, defenders, and judges. While a
strict system of stare decisis might not be desirable in a conduct code
context, at least some effort should be made to achieve consistency
between decisions over time.
Of course, the FERPA concerns addressed above265 apply with
equal force to the disclosure of decisions of academic disciplinary
proceedings. However, courts have made clear that redaction of
identifying information relating to particular students solves any FERPA
concerns with regard to the results of academic disciplinary actions.266
And, redaction of such identifying information should not limit any of
the benefits of published decisions identified above. Thus, conduct code
tribunals should issue redacted versions of their written decisions
following the completion of conduct code proceedings.

263. See Berger & Berger, supra note 16, at 344.
264. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 253-58 and accompanying text.
266. See, e.g., Miami Univ., 294 F.3d at 814; Unincorporated Operating Div. of Ind.
Newspapers, Inc. v. Tr. of Ind. Univ., 787 N.E.2d 893, 908 (Ind. App. 2003).
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VII. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing discussion, the conclusion here is that a
law school code should be a relatively detailed set of regulatory rules,
designed to foster an environment conducive to fair academic
competition and equitable evaluation and review processes within a law
school community. The code should include substantive provisions
detailing conduct which is impermissible in light of that goal, as well as
procedures to be utilized to enforce those substantive provisions, and
sanctions to be imposed in the event that violations of the code are
established. There are a number of positive reasons why a regulatory
approach to law school codes should be preferred. First, such an
approach is consistent with the knowledge that graduate professional
students already have regarding conduct that is not permissible in an
academic setting. Second, a regulatory approach is most consistent with
both a decades long trend and the current state of regulation of the legal
profession itself. Having a law school code which mirrors the relevant
professional code in that respect may help serve the law school’s goal of
developing future legal practitioners who will practice effectively within
the boundaries set forth by the relevant professional code.
Another reason favoring a regulatory approach to law school codes,
is that law school professors, administrators, and others who might be
called upon to draft such codes are likely to possess to a great degree the
skills and experience needed to draft such codes effectively, given the
similarity of such codes to other types of legal codes. Finally, given the
conclusion here that providing a framework for fair academic
competition and reliable evaluation and review mechanisms is the most
important goal to be served by a law school code, the regulatory
approach advocated seems most likely to serve that ultimate goal.
There are also negative reasons why regulatory objectives should
be favored over aspirational and educational ones in the law school code
context. First, for reasons outlined above, it is questionable whether,
even under the best conditions, codes can effectively serve broadly
aspirational functions. And, to the extent that codes can successfully
serve aspirational functions, it seems unlikely that the conditions needed
to do so are present in the law school context. For example, codes are
most likely to be successful in serving broadly aspirational goals in
small, homogeneous communities. Yet most modern law schools lack
those characteristics. Additionally, aspirational codes must necessarily
employ very broad standards and general language. Yet such provisions
are likely to undermine the very important regulatory goals of a code.
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There is more reason to believe that a law school code can
effectively serve at least some educational functions. For example, a
law school code can certainly provide examples of the types of conduct
that are prohibited by the code, thus helping to educate students with
regard to the code’s requirements. Additionally, by allowing students to
play important roles in administration of the code, and by opening code
proceedings to the broader student population to as great an extent as is
feasible, the code is also likely to serve additional educational functions.
There is also reason to doubt, however, whether law school codes can
have much impact on the education in ethics of future lawyers in the
broadest sense (which of course, runs into the aspirational functions of
the code as well). Unless and until legal academics are willing to
incorporate the law school code into the substantive materials that they
teach, it seems unlikely that the code will provide education in ethics to
a greater degree than outlined above. And, there appears to be little
appetite among legal academics to expand the role of the law school’s
code into the substantive curriculum.
Given all of these reasons, adopting a regulatory function as the
primary goal of a law school code seems appropriate. In light of that
goal, this article next attempted to present the broad outlines of a code
that would serve that goal. Such a code would provide for an initial
investigatory phase regarding alleged code violations, with students
playing the key role in this and subsequent phases of the process under
the code, in order to determine that only meritorious allegations be
pursued. Efforts would then be undertaken to resolve the allegations
cooperatively, utilizing any of a number of familiar alternative dispute
resolution techniques. If efforts to resolve a meritorious allegation
cooperatively are unsuccessful, however, then the opportunity for a full
blown adversary hearing should be provided. All of the hallmarks of
due process should be available to the accused in such hearings,
including adequate notice, the opportunity to discover in advance of
hearing the evidence and witnesses that will be presented, the
availability of student or professional counsel (at the accused’s expense),
and the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.
The standard of proof at hearings under the code should be at least
a preponderance of, or perhaps even clear and convincing evidence.
Such hearings should be open to the extent possible consistent with
applicable federal and state law. Redacted versions of the decisions of
the relevant code tribunal should be made available to the entire law
school community, and a loose system of precedent should be adopted
so that prior code decisions are given at least some weight in deciding
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future code proceedings. Finally, there should be at least some
opportunity for review of code tribunal proceedings by the Dean or some
appellate body.
Perhaps in light of the possible objectives of a law school code
discussed in the beginning of this article, the ultimate objectives
advocated here may sound unambitious or uninspiring. However, the
effective provision of an ethical environment within the law school for
the conduct of the school’s core academic functions is no small
accomplishment. And, the provision of such an environment may well
be at least a first step toward developing effective and ethical legal
practitioners. And that, after all, is the ultimate goal for many of us in
legal academia.
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